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It is crucial for public health emergency planners and responders to realize and 
account for socioeconomic barriers and the challenges they pose when faced with a 
bioterrorism, infectious disease, or other emerging public health threat impacting the 
homeland. The study design of this research incorporated two particular paradigms, 
investigative and predictive. The researcher found that social and economic factors 
account for nearly 40 percent of health outcomes in the United States. Public health and 
its response partners need to plan for emergencies using a “60/40” lens. He discovered 
that at least 40 percent of populations may not receive the critical health care they require 
in emergencies because of socioeconomic status or related factors. This thesis 
investigated the language, culture and historical trauma barriers—and affiliated 
challenges, such as fear and distrust—that exist throughout the country. Given these 
findings, this thesis provides both policy- and strategy-level recommendations to assist 
public health and healthcare practitioners in their efforts to “bridge the gap” that exists 
within and between community populations in the United States. Disciplines that 
consider implementing these recommendations will help minimize significant, and 
perhaps avoidable, consequences that follow health-related emergencies or varied 
disasters impacting the homeland.  
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The basis for this thesis and research topic stems from certain local and state 
Public Health Emergency Preparedness grant activities—managed by the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)—focused on jurisdictions’ ability to dispense life-
saving medications and medical supplies to 100 percent of an impacted population within 
48 hours of a bioterrorism incident.1 Managing the state emergency medical 
countermeasure program for many years, the researcher felt it was important to examine 
barriers that local and state public health practitioners face in their missions to provide 
emergency medications, healthcare, or other services as a result of widespread infectious 
disease outbreaks and bioterrorism incidents. 
He questioned how it would be possible for health practitioners to reach entire 
impacted populations within 48 hours when socioeconomic barriers, fear, and distrust of 
government exist in communities. The purpose of the research was to understand better 
the extent of these barriers—the significance and relevancy of the barriers—and how they 
impede response to emerging health threats. Many socioeconomic barriers and affiliated 
challenges need to be considered but this research was based on three primary “pillars” 
associated to the social determinants of health, which are (1) language, (2) culture, and 
(3) historical trauma.2 His findings centered around the barriers—along with contributing 
factors, such as fear and distrust of government—to understand better their connection or 
disconnection to health emergencies. The results gathered and data analyzed presented a 
much larger problem space than anticipated.  
Before researching this topic, when considering the CDC’s model of providing 
medications and healthcare to 100 percent of a population within 48 hours of a dire health 
emergency, the researcher predicted a more realistic percentage would be the ability to 
reach 80–90 percent of a population in that timeframe. After researching barriers across 
                                                 
1 “Cities Readiness Initiative Strategic National Stockpile,” accessed February 20, 2016, http://www. 
cdc.gov/phpr/stockpile/cri/index.htm. 
2 “Social Determinants of Health: Know What Affects Health,” last updated October 13, 2016, http:// 
www.cdc.gov/socialdeterminants/.  
 xvi 
the United States that language, culture, and historical trauma present—along with fear 
and distrust of government—the percentage significantly dropped. It became more 
realistic that reaching 60 percent of community populations within the critical time period 
for emergency antibiotics to be effective is more accurately the baseline from which 
public health and healthcare practitioners should work. It became more and more 
apparent as he researched this subject matter that both the gaps—and the impacts that 
stem from these gaps—have been vastly underestimated in this nation’s current 
operational and strategic planning and response practices.  
This research is based on the argument that socioeconomic barriers have 
significant impacts in an event requiring emergency medication dispensing to 100 percent 
of a population in 48 hours. Before researching the event, the researcher had no idea that 
the gap to be bridged would be so expansive and far-reaching. Changes will not happen 
overnight, but with dedicated policy and strategy level efforts—what seem like daunting, 
impossible tasks—can be achieved and the socioeconomic gap can be bridged. The 
following recommendations aim to assist practitioners with these efforts. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Community Outreach 
To help mitigate against differential rates of morbidity and mortality in future 
health emergencies, it is critical that the entire U.S. public, including specific subgroups, 
have access to credible, accessible, and meaningful information that enables them to 
make appropriate use of potentially lifesaving emergency medical countermeasures. 
2. Building Trust through Community Resilience  
Building community resilience to disasters is essential and is commonly described 
as “the ability to mitigate and rebound quickly.”3 Viewing preparedness through a 
community resilience lens provides a foundation to work from for improving community 
engagement and outreach efforts that will strengthen community relationships and 
                                                 
3 Alonzo Plough et al., “Building Community Disaster Resilience: Perspectives from a Large Urban 
County Department of Public Health,” American Journal of Public Health 103, no. 7 (2013): 1190–97, doi: 
10.2105/AJPH.2013.301268.  
 xvii 
improve both communication strategies and trust with entire populations across the 
homeland. 
3. Using Appropriate “Whole Community” Risk Communications to 
Bridge the Gap 
Effective risk communications serve as the basis emergency response missions to 
varied health emergencies.4 The researcher has learned that emergency messaging needs 
to be developed in a “culturally appropriate manner” to ensure “whole community” 
populations adhere to emergency messaging and safety recommendations put forth by 
health and healthcare practitioners as a result of an emerging health threat.5 
B. CONCLUSION 
Efforts and emphasis placed on activities to “bridge the gap” will further reduce 
fear, distrust, and misperceptions of preferential treatment among populations. As a 
result, lower mobility and morality rates could be expected and the risk of rioting, civil 
unrest, and community divisiveness lessened across the homeland. 
                                                 
4 Plough et al., “Building Community Disaster Resilience: Perspectives from a Large Urban County 
Department of Public Health,” American Journal of Public Health, 1190–97. 
5 Randy Rowel et al., A Guide to Enhance Risk Communication among Low-Income Populations 
(Baltimore, MD: Morgan State University School Community Health and Policy, Department of Behavior 
Health Sciences 2009), http://serve.mt.gov/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/A-Guide-to-Enhance-Risk-
Communication-Among-Low-Income-Populations.pdf.  
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A frame for Homeland Security is…humanity.1 
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), along with a host of federal partners, established 
programs to prepare, train and educate local, state, and federal public health and 
healthcare practitioners in emergency response. These efforts included assessing the 
public health workforce’s abilities and targeted capabilities to respond to a wide-range of 
emergencies including a bioterrorism incident involving the release of aerosolized 
anthrax. The CDC developed a program in 2004 called the “Cities Readiness Initiative” 
(CRI). The CRI program is a federally funded effort to “prepare major U.S. cities and 
metropolitan areas to effectively respond to large scale public health emergencies by 
dispensing life-saving medications and medical supplies from the Strategic National 
Stockpile to their entire identified population within 48 hours of the decision to do so.”2 
Although a wide-spread anthrax attack has not happened within the homeland, 
emergencies, such as H1N1 and Hurricane Katrina, have provided evidence that even 
after the significant amount of federal funding post-9/11; socioeconomic factors in 
emergent situations still pose major problems for the public health workforce and first 
responders. Many socioeconomic barriers need to be considered but the scope of this 
research is based on three primary “pillars” associated to the social determinants of health 
(SDoH), which are (1) language, (2) culture, and (3) historical trauma.3 
The American Psychological Association (APA) describes socioeconomic status 
(SES) as the “social standing or class” of individuals or groups in a community.4 
                                                 
1 Anders Strindberg, “My place in the Homeland Security Enterprise” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Center for Homeland Defense and Security, Monterey, California, October 5, 2016).  
2 “Cities Readiness Initiative Strategic National Stockpile,” accessed February 20, 2016, http:// 
www.cdc.gov/phpr/stockpile/cri/index.htm.  
3 “Social Determinants of Health: Know What Affects Health,” last updated October 13, 2016, 
http://www.cdc.gov/socialdeterminants/.  
4 “Socioeconomic Status,” accessed January 28, 2017, http://www.apa.org/topics/socioeconomic-
status/index.aspx.  
 2 
Researchers routinely examine the relationship between SES factors, such as low literacy, 
salary and employment history, and the inequalities that exist for populations 
experiencing these challenges in their lives.5 These determinants are important to 
understand and take into account as evidence supports that these factors contribute to 
higher morbidity and mortality rates in disasters.6 Policy makers need to address and 
account for a host of SES factors to reduce the negative outcomes that affect the health of 
entire populations across the homeland.7 This thesis addresses certain socioeconomic 
gaps that exist between populations and discusses the reality that SES and SDoH impede 
response to emergent health events impacting the homeland.  
Many of these barriers are culturally interwoven, rather than isolated, increasing 
the challenges for responders faced with serving entire populations. According to the 
County Health Rankings report, social and economic factors account for 40 percent of 
health outcomes.8 Public health practitioners and their response partners need to plan for 
emergencies using a “60/40” lens. Research supports at least 40 percent of populations 
may not receive the care they require because of these and other inherent socioeconomic 
barriers.9  
The importance and relevance of this subject matter cannot be summarized any 
better than relaying the vision of the Wisconsin State Health Plan (Healthiest Wisconsin 
2020), which is simply “everyone living better, longer.”10 The key word in this research, 
this thesis, and the Wisconsin State Health Plan, is “everyone.”  
If this nation does not get a better grasp on socioeconomic barriers before a major 
health emergency occurs—such as the release of aerosolized anthrax or an acute 
                                                 
5 “Socioeconomic Status.” 
6 S. Leonard Syme, Bonnie Lefkowitz, and Barbara Kivimae Krimgold, “Incorporating Socioeconomic 
Factors into U.S. Health Policy: Addressing the Barriers,” Health Affairs 21, no. 2 (March 1, 2002): 113–
18, doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.21.2.113 PMID: 11900151. 
7 Ibid. 
8 “Our Approach,” accessed May 14, 2016, http://www.countyhealthrankings.org/our-approach.  
9 Ibid. 
10 “Wisconsin State Health Plan—Healthiest Wisconsin 2020,” August 28, 2014, https://www.dhs. 
wisconsin.gov/node/134/draft.  
 3 
communicable disease outbreak—under-served, under-represented, populations will 
experience significantly worse health outcomes.11 This scenario presents other 
consequences, such as social injustice. “One of the leading social injustices from one 
population to the next is access to healthcare or lack thereof. Whether it’s due to 
socioeconomic circumstances, like poverty or income status, disadvantaged members of 
society simply do not have access to healthcare, which only worsens social injustice.”12 
The platform from which public health is based is social justice and ensuring “what is 
best for all of us, not just a few of us.”13 
Researching the significance of these interwoven socioeconomic barriers—and 
their effects on the effective response to health emergencies—will lessen the 
consequences that a disaster, bioterrorism attack, or pandemic outbreak pose. This thesis 
includes recommendations for how public health and healthcare practitioners can increase 
outreach efforts within their specific, diverse populations to lessen the death rates in 
health emergencies impacting populations. It is critical that all response disciplines are 
aware of—and plan for—varied, jurisdictional-specific, socioeconomic barriers and the 
impacts, challenges, and consequences they present in responding to emergencies. This 
thesis explains and outlines the importance of the gaps these barriers pose and provide 
recommendations to close them to save more lives during emergent events.  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION AND PROBLEM SPACE  
The research question is: “Bridging the Gap: To what extent do socioeconomic 
barriers impede response to emerging health threats?” This thesis examines challenges 
that face health practitioners tasked with outreach to populations in need of medical 
countermeasures or healthcare due to a bioterrorism incident or infectious disease 
outbreak. The researcher argues that certain socioeconomic factors present significant 
challenges to responders working in health emergencies and can lead to such 
                                                 
11 “Social Justice and Public Health—Where They Intersect,” accessed March 5, 2016, http://social 
work.une.edu/resources/news/social-justice-and-public-health-where-they-intersect/.  
12 Ibid. 
13 “Mission, Vision, and Values,” accessed May 30, 2016, http://publichealth.uams.edu/about-
coph/mission-vision-and-values/.  
 4 
consequences as rioting (due to the perception of preferential treatment), community 
divisions, and higher mortality and morbidity rates. This research started with exploring 
the practicality of existing health policies and programs, such as the CDC’s CRI program, 
focused on “dispensing life-saving medications and medical supplies from the Strategic 
National Stockpile to their entire identified population within 48 hours of the decision to 
do so.”14  
Can any health agency ensure that 100 percent of its population will receive 
medicine or medical attention within 48 hours of a bioterrorism emergency? How about a 
widely, quickly-spreading infectious disease? Will socioeconomic barriers, fear, or 
distrust of government prevent health practitioners and their partners in reaching entire 
populations in any severe health emergency? The researcher’s answer is yes. This issue 
forms the problem space and the basis of his research and this thesis.  
B. RESEARCH PLAN 
1. Study Design and Research Paradigms  
This thesis provides both analytics and strategies to assist public health 
practitioners and partners in closing socioeconomic gaps to help ensure all populations 
receive the critical healthcare needed in response to varied, future emergent health threats 
and disasters. The study design of this research incorporated two particular paradigms, 
investigative and predictive. 
The researcher conducted research using the investigative paradigm approach to 
determine the relationships, connections, disconnections, and barriers involved that 
impede the rapid dispensing of emergency medications and critical healthcare—to entire 
populations—as the result of a widespread bioterrorism or other health emergency.  
He also conducted research using a predictive paradigm approach. It was helpful 
in the forecasting of impacts to populations living in certain environments, in certain 
situations, and helped describe the consequences that socioeconomic barriers present 
during pandemics or other emergent health events.  
                                                 
14 “Cities Readiness Initiative Strategic National Stockpile.” 
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2. Literature Search Design and Results 
In support of this thesis, literature searches contained the gathering of peer 
reviewed journal articles and governmental reports from 2001 through the present. 
Articles were obtained using various electronic databases including PubMed, and the 
Homeland Security Digital Library (HSDL). Additionally, the internet provided 
significant details via web searches using the isolated and combined terms that include 
but are not limited to: the CRI, socio-economic barriers, cultural barriers, fear, distrust, 
fear management, historical trauma, language barriers, public health, H1N1, Hurricane 
Katrina, the Tuskegee Study, forced sterilization, internment camps, trauma, violence, 
anti-government attitudes, the CDC, the World Health Organization (WHO), infectious 
disease, healthcare, emergency preparedness, bioterrorism, health equity, national 
culturally and linguistically appropriate services (CLAS) standards, severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS), social determinants of health, and emergency response. 
Web-based resources were primarily used to explore socioeconomic barriers and their 
association to health emergencies.  
Literature was selected for inclusion if it contained information regarding the 
socioeconomic factors in emergencies or generally how language, culture, and past, 
historical events impact present day emergency response priorities. Research was also 
collected if it was relevant to the public’s perception or skepticism of government-
managed health services, as well as social vulnerability and social justice and injustice 
associated to healthcare needs.  
Research for this thesis topic area covered a plethora of content from reliable, 
trusted, peer-reviewed sources related to subject matter. As of result of this research, an 
estimated 350 credible sources were accessed, read, and saved. Many provided evidence 
of the “problem space” and are cited throughout the chapters of the thesis. References 
included at the end of this thesis list sources to assist future research projects by others 
looking to expand upon the topic areas of this thesis.  
The literature reviewed reinforced the notion that practitioners need to more 
purposely address socioeconomic barriers, fear, and distrust in their communities to help 
 6 
minimize the impacts of health emergencies. Past after action reports (AARs) and other 
incident-based publications support that socioeconomic barriers have and continue to 
present significant challenges to public health practitioners, such as those stemming from 
the response to the H1N1 outbreak in 2008 and 2009. SES factors include a variety of 
increased risks and vulnerabilities and susceptibilities (particularly to severe infectious 
disease). Another barrier to consider is the perception of inequality of services to 
community populations that contribute to increased anxiety, fear, distrust, and civil unrest 
across the homeland and all have and may continue to result in higher morbidity and 
mortality rates as a result of a health emergency.15 The following section provides 
chapter titles and overviews of topic areas contained in this thesis that serve as a 
complement to Chapter 1: Introduction. 
C. THESIS OUTLINE 
Chapter II, Language Barriers: Chapter II examines the varied linguistic 
challenges that exist for planning and responders to consider when dealing with emergent 
events. Topic areas within the chapter include analysis of language barriers in major 
cities, as well as communication and outreach strategies to address limited English 
proficiency (LEP) populations in health emergencies. 
Chapter III, Culture Barriers: Chapter III focuses on certain cultural barriers that 
exist within communities posing challenges to response missions in health emergencies. 
Topic areas include cultural competency—and their relationship to emergent situations—
the Giger and Davidhizar Transcultural Assessment Model (GDTAM) and cultural 
barrier situations experienced during Hurricane Katrina.  
Chapter IV, Historical Trauma: Chapter IV explores and describes how traumatic 
experiences of the past directly associate to future public health response outcomes. A 
particular focus is placed on Native American, African American, Asian American, and 
Puerto Rican historical situations and dynamics. Fear and distrust of government—that 
stem from historical trauma—are also described in this chapter. 
                                                 
15 Sandra Crouse Quinn et al., “Racial Disparities in Exposure, Susceptibility, and Access to Health 
Care in the U.S. H1N1 Influenza Pandemic,” American Journal of Public Health 101, no. 2 (February 
2011): 285–93, doi: 10.2105/AJPH.2009.188029 PMID: 21164098 PMCID: PMC3020202.  
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Chapter V, SARS and Canada Case Study: Chapter V examines Canadian public 
health practitioner’s SARS isolation and quarantine practices, with respect to 
socioeconomic factors. The chapter highlights broad legal and policy challenges facing 
the United States if a similar widespread infectious disease were to impact the homeland. 
Chapter VI, Recommendations and Conclusion: Chapter VI provides 
recommendations to address socioeconomic barriers, fear, distrust, and similar challenges 
facing health practitioners faced with response to emerging health threats. A particular 
emphasis is placed on community outreach strategies—as well as fear management 
practices—to minimize impacts to community populations if bioterrorism events or 
widespread, highly-pathogenic infectious disease outbreaks were to occur in the 
homeland. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Language, culture, and historical trauma barriers create significant challenges—
and pose unique consequences—to government-led health response missions. These 
barriers are problematic and must be accounted for to ensure communities receive the 
healthcare and assistance needed in emergencies. This thesis examines the language, 
culture, and historical trauma barriers—and affiliated challenges, such as fear and 
distrust—and provides policy and strategy level recommendations to assist practitioners 
in their efforts to bridge the gap that exists between community populations throughout 
the homeland. It also suggests and provides some starting points for affiliated research 
areas to assist future practitioners looking to further these efforts. 
The next chapter examines language barriers that exist across the homeland and 
the relevance that language challenges have on the response to emerging health threats. 
 8 
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II. LANGUAGE BARRIERS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since the attacks on 9/11, the mission of the public health and healthcare 
workforce has expanded to include planning and response activities related to 
bioterrorism emergencies impacting their communities. The mailing of anthrax-laced 
envelopes to media outlets and congressional offices led the CDC to found the CRI 
program. The CRI program was established to “assist jurisdictions in their planning for 
response to a large scale terrorist event by dispensing antibiotics to their entire identified 
population within 48 hours.”16 According to the CDC, quickly providing antibiotics to 
impacted populations can prevent anthrax from developing in people who “have been 
exposed but have not developed symptoms.” State and local public health and healthcare 
emergency preparedness plans are centered on dispensing operations of these medications 
when considering an anthrax scenario.17 The intent of this chapter is to analyze if 
language barriers pose a significant challenge in delivering emergency medications to 
entire populations in a short amount of time, and if so, provide recommendations to 
public health, healthcare, and their partners to ensure entire populations receive 
medications within 48 hours of an aerosolized anthrax attack. The information provided 
in this chapter will assist all emergency responders in their strategies to address linguistic 
challenges in rapidly-developing disasters to reduce lives lost in impacted communities. 
B. LANGUAGE BARRIERS IN MAJOR CITIES 
In emergency situations, communication breakdowns affecting populations that 
require help from caregivers can have dire consequences. Factors, such as language and 
cultural barriers among non-native speakers, cause comprehension difficulty that must be 
                                                 
16 “CDC Cities Readiness Initiative, Q&A,” accessed October 29, 2015, http://www.bt.cdc.gov/ 
cri/qa.asp.  
17 “Prevention, Anthrax,” accessed November 1, 2015, http://www.cdc.gov/anthrax/medical-care/ 
prevention.html.  
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overcome.18 Language barriers pose a challenge to any community but are especially 
critical in densely-populated areas. In emergencies, people with LEP are at increased risk. 
Communicating effectively before, during, and after health emergencies or other disasters 
can be challenging due to socioeconomic barriers, such as language, cultural, and 
historical trauma.19 
In New York City, where an estimated 200 languages are spoken, half of New 
Yorkers speak a language other than English.20 Likewise, Los Angeles is also highly 
ethnically diverse, with 224 languages spoken citywide, with less than 50 percent of the 
population speaking English as their first language. Besides Spanish, other languages 
common to the Los Angeles area include Korean, Filipino, Armenian, Chinese, and 
Persian.21  
C. ADDRESSING THE LINGUISTIC BARRIER 
In a response requiring notification to and engagement with 100 percent of the 
population, such as pandemic outbreaks or bioterrorism incidents, the public health 
workforce and their partners must be prepared to relay critical alerts, notification and 
action-needed messaging swiftly to their non-English or LEP-speaking populations. 
“Effective implementation of public health preparedness programs and policies will 
require compliance from all residents, including linguistically diverse populations. 
Preparedness strategies will need to recognize factors related to culture, language, 
literacy, and trust that are likely to play a major role in achieving their objectives.”22 This 
                                                 
18 Harvey Pressman, Andrea Pietrzyk, and Jenifer Schneider, Overcoming Communication Barriers in 
Emergency Situations: Some Basic Tools (Monterey, CA: Central Coast Children’s Foundation, Inc., 2012), 
http://www.centralcoastchildrensfoundation.org/draft/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Emergency-Communica 
tion-Resources.pdf. 
19 “Communicating with Limited English Proficiency Populations,” accessed October 22, 2015, 
http://www.nwcphp.org/training/opportunities/webinars/communicating-with-limited-english-proficiency-
populations.  
20 “Population,” accessed October 22, 2015, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/census/pop_facts. 
shtml.  
21 “Los Angeles—Speaking the Language,” accessed September 26, 2015, http://www.expatfocus. 
com/expatriate-los-angeles-language.  
22 Dennis P. Andrulis, Nadia J. Siddiqui, and Jenna L. Gantner, “Preparing Racially and Ethnically 
Diverse Communities for Public Health Emergencies,” Health Affairs 26, no. 5 (September 2007): 1269–
1279, http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/26/5/1269.full. 
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cannot happen without extensive work involving the pre-planning and engagement within 
community-based organizations before emergencies occur. Ensuring that response plans 
reflect ways to address language barriers can minimize emergent impacts. Access to 
medical interpreters will help establish and improve the “cultural and linguistic linkages 
to LEP communities.”23 
According to the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), 
“addressing language challenges can help disaster responders with their missions and it is 
important to introduce techniques for handling language barriers and develop and 
implement strategies for effectively working with interpreters and bilingual staff in 
emergency situations.”24 Research supports that language and cultural differences pose 
serious barriers to public health practitioners and healthcare providers reaching and 
assisting certain populations impacted by health emergency or other disaster scenarios.25 
Individuals with language barriers face a number of challenges with receiving timely, 
accurate, and life-saving information during emergency situations impacting the 
homeland.26  
Although the mass release of weaponized anthrax has not yet happened in the 
United States, Dr. Jeffrey W. Runge, chief medical officer at the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, told a congressional subcommittee on July 22, 2008 that the threat of 
a widespread biological attack to the United States is substantial. He also shared that 
government officials are aware that certain terrorist groups have used biological agents as 
instruments of warfare on their enemies and that these weapons are well within the 
                                                 
23 Sharyne Shiu-Thornton et al., “Disaster Preparedness for Limited English Proficient Communities: 
Medical Interpreters as Cultural Brokers and Gatekeepers,” Public Health Reports 122, no. 4 (2007): 466–
71.  
24 Office of Minority Health, Cultural Competency in Disaster Response: A Review of Current 
Concepts, Policies and Practices (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 2008), 
https://www.thinkculturalhealth.hhs.gov/pdfs/DisasterPersonneEnvironmentalScan.pdf. 
25 Shiu-Thornton et al., “Disaster Preparedness for Limited English Proficient Communities: Medical 
Interpreters as Cultural Brokers and Gatekeepers,” 466–71. 
26 Jonathan Purtle, Nadia J. Siddiqui, and Dennis P. Andrulis, Language Issues and Barriers (Austin, 
TX: Texas Health Institute, 2015), http://www.texashealthinstitute.org/uploads/1/3/5/3/13535548/langua 
ge_issues_and_barriers-purtle.pdf. 
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terrorists’ reach.27 To prepare better for an aerosolized anthrax release, planners, and 
responders can learn from emergency events, such as the 1995 Northridge earthquake, 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, the 2007 Southern California wildfires, as well as 
countless other natural and manmade disasters.28 Evidence supports that language 
barriers posed significant challenges to populations impacted by these incidents.29 
With that in mind, how do local and state health departments and their partners 
evaluate and develop strategies and policies to address language barriers within their 
jurisdictions prior to emergencies? One way is through annual response assessment 
requirements from the CDC’s Division of State and Local Readiness (DSLR). 
Metropolitan cities participate in a CDC-managed program known as the CRI. A major 
element of the annual state and federal Medical Countermeasure/Operational Readiness 
Review (MCM/ORR) is the ability of local responders to reach 100 percent of diverse, 
densely-populated jurisdictional populations to dispense emergency medications in 
response to a large-scale bioterrorist event within 48 hours.30 This ability requires 
extensive, planned outreach to vulnerable populations and evaluating gaps and barriers 
that exist within states most populated areas. A section of the MCM/ORR assessment 
addresses practices conducted by local and state health practitioners and focuses on 
methods for the identification and outreach to vulnerable or at-risk populations, which 
includes those with language barriers.31 Previously, these challenges were examined in 
some major cities; but what do linguistic barriers look like in Wisconsin? 
                                                 
27 “Busting the Anthrax Myth,” accessed November 21, 2015, https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/ 
busting_anthrax_myth.  
28 Purtle, Siddiqui, and Andrulis, Language Issues and Barriers. 
29 Ibid. 
30 “Strategic National Stockpile,” accessed October 2, 2015, http://www.cdc.gov/phpr/stockpile/ 
stockpile.htm. 
31 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Medical Countermeasure (MCM) Operational 
Readiness Review (ORR) Guidance, Budget Period 3, July 1, 2014–June 30, 2015 (Bismarck, ND: North 
Dakota Department of Health, 2015), https://www.ndhealth.gov/EPR/PHP/MCM%20ORR%20Guidance_ 
FINAL.pdf. 
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D. ADDRESSING LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENCY CHALLENGES IN 
WISCONSIN  
It is no surprise that major diverse cities have linguistic barriers to consider when 
evaluating their emergency planning and response protocols. Wisconsin is also a very 
diverse state with many languages spoken, especially in the Milwaukee area where over 
15 percent of individuals surveyed speak Spanish or Hmong.32 In Wisconsin, public 
health agencies and healthcare organizations strive to determine the true magnitude of 
those impacted in emergencies and the relationship to language barriers. A report from 
The Joint Commission (TJC), an accreditation group responsible for the development and 
regulating of patient safety and appropriate standards of healthcare care standards for 
hospitals and affiliated organizations across the country; cites low health literacy, cultural 
barriers, and limited English proficiency as the “triple threat” to effective health 
communication.33 Addressing linguistic barriers in the Milwaukee area center around 
three particular groups; the Hispanic, Hmong, and deaf and hard-of-hearing (DHH) 
populations.  
Data from the Milwaukee metropolitan statistical area (MSA) supports that 
populations making up the Hispanic, Hmong, and DHH populations pose one of the 
largest response challenges that public health and healthcare emergency preparedness 
practitioners may encounter when dealing with an emergent event.34 Although other 
languages are spoken, and therefore, translation or interpretation barriers can certainly 
exist, the Wisconsin Department of Health Services is increasing engagement and 
partnership with local health entities located in Milwaukee County to assess and 
determine innovative ways to close the increasing linguistic barriers that challenge 
response missions, such as those based on pandemic outbreaks or bioterrorism attacks.35  
                                                 
32 “Languages in Milwaukee, Wisconsin (City),” accessed October 2, 2015, http://statisticalatlas.com/ 
place/Wisconsin/Milwaukee/Languages.  
33 “Understanding Cultural and Linguistic Barriers to Health Literacy,” accessed October 29, 2015, 
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/717468.  
34 “Languages in Milwaukee, Wisconsin (City).” 
35 “National CLAS Standards,” accessed October 28, 2015, https://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/minority-
health/clas.htm.  
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E. HOW ARE LINGUISTIC BARRIERS DETERMINED AND 
EVALUATED? 
A factor to consider when determining language barriers posed to health 
emergency response is the basis and accuracy of a jurisdiction’s population data used by 
practitioners to develop their policies and strategies for outreach. The primary collection 
method (and basis for the MCM/ORR and other health planning and response 
assessments) stem from the United States Census Bureau, which can undercount those 
with language barriers.36 Research supports that people of certain ethnicities or in 
poverty situations are historically undercounted and have lower response rates to current 
methods used to collect census data, such via door-to-door mailings.37 Inaccuracy of 
census data among certain community groups can be attributed to many reasons. For 
example, individuals with LEP or literacy barriers have difficulty understanding the 
purpose of the census or see the census as a form of government enforcement leading to 
the fear and distrust issue discussed later in this thesis.38 It is easy to understand how 
populations could misinterpret the reasons behind census participation. A longstanding 
issue with government programs is the trust or lack of trust that exists with certain 
populations. As it relates to census data collection practices, some fear that their 
responses may be used by government officials to deport or incarcerate individual or 
family members or may remove their access to the social welfare programs they rely on 
for assistance.39 Contributing to the problems associated with the census platform in 
terms of data accuracy is the frequency with which the data is collected. The Census 
Bureau collects data every 10 years; however, in Wisconsin, nearly 1,000 refugees arrive 
each year most of whom are non-English speaking or are of limited-English 
proficiency.40 Health practitioners working to gauge and develop strategies to address 
language barriers may find their numbers are much higher than expected if working from 
                                                 





40 “Statistics, Population & Census Data,” accessed October 31, 2015, http://dcf.wi.gov/refugee/ 
statistics.htm.  
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census data that is, for instance, nine years old. According to the State of Wisconsin 
Minority Health Officer, the census data must be accompanied with “whole community” 
engagement and broader outreach to have a more accurate grasp on the cultural and 
linguistic barriers in jurisdictions. Not doing so may result in increased morbidity and 
mortality numbers in pandemic outbreaks, bioterrorism or other emergency incidents 
based on inaccurate predictions. Thus far, this chapter has discussed non-English 
speaking or limited English proficiency challenges that public health and healthcare 
practitioners should consider when planning for pandemic or bioterrorism incidents; but 
what about those who are deaf or hard-of-hearing?  
F. CONSIDERING DEAF AND HARD-OF-HEARING POPULATIONS IN 
EMERGENCIES 
Are emergency planning and response practitioners considering DHH 
populations? Sign Language Interpreter Lydia Callis writes, “Deaf individuals are more 
likely to miss early warnings because they aren’t listening to the radio or television and 
when Hurricane Katrina hit, there seemed to be no FEMA provisions for the hard-of-
hearing, and deaf survivors were never informed when volunteer interpreters were finally 
available.”41  
For those reporting a disability in the hearing, vision, cognitive, ambulatory, self-
care, or independent living categories, Milwaukee data supports that 3.7 percent of adults 
ages 18–65 are deaf or hard-of-hearing with 14.3 percent of the population 65 and older 
reported as a deaf or hard-of-hearing individual.42 One particular research study found 
that very few state emergency operations plans (EOPs) mention how they would contact 
deaf people in an emergency. “There are huge gaps and barriers in communication during 
emergencies,” said Donna Dahrouge, a project manager at UC Berkeley’s Preparedness 
                                                 
41 Lydia Callis, “Deaf during Disaster,” Interpreting Services, accessed October 31, 2015, http://www. 
signlanguagenyc.com/deaf-during-disaster/.  
42 Wisconsin Department of Health Services, County Disability Estimates, 2008 (Madison, WI: 
Wisconsin Department of Health Services, 2010), https://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/disabilities/physical/ 
acs2008disbycounty.pdf.  
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and Emergency Response Research Center (PERRC).43 PERRC surveyed over 50 EOPs 
from local and state governments across the country and found that while over 50 percent 
of EOPs made mention of vulnerable or at-risk populations, only 31 percent (of the 55 
percent who mention these groups) specifically referred to those with impaired hearing.44 
Following the study, meetings were held with key emergency personnel from the 55 
locations surveyed and although many said they acknowledged that communicating with 
hearing impaired individuals would pose a significant challenge to their response 
missions, only roughly 50 percent said they were aware of particular protocols and 
procedures for communicating with hearing impaired folks in emergencies and even less 
knew how to conduct or accept a relay phone call from a deaf or hard-of-hearing 
person.45 
Evidence supports that at least three strategies are available that policymakers, 
planners, and responders can take to address linguistic barriers in their communities. 
First, it is critically important to identify LEP populations and develop, maintain, and 
improve relationships with LEP and DHH persons. Working with linguistically diverse 
community partners—such as the community-based organizations (CBOs) and faith-
based organizations (FBOs) serving these populations—can go a long way to address 
linguistic challenges prior to health emergencies and thus improving outcomes for 
impacted LEP groups.46 Second, although federal public health and healthcare 
preparedness funding allocations continue to decline, state and local jurisdictions need to 
determine activity priorities based on jurisdictional gaps.47 In Wisconsin, surveys have 
been conducted by state preparedness programs the last three years across all 72 counties. 
The results have shown an increase of linguistic gaps in communities, especially in the 
                                                 
43 Susan FitzGerald, “Gaps in Emergency Preparedness for Hearing Impaired Raise Alarm,” The 
Hearing Journal 66, no. 3 (March 2013): 20–22, http://journals.lww.com/thehearingjournal/Fulltext/2013/ 
03000/Gaps_in_Emergency_Preparedness_for_Hearing.7.aspx. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid.  
46 Purtle, Siddiqui, and Andrulis, Language Issues and Barriers. 
47 Lisa Schnirring, “Federal Funds for Disaster Preparedness Decline,” Center for Infectious Disease 
Research and Policy, July 8, 2013, http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2013/07/federal-funds-
disaster-preparedness-decline. 
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most populated areas, supporting a shift in public health and hospital preparedness tasks 
and activities, as well as project funding allocations. These include, but are not limited to, 
the planning and response elements associated to an aerosolized anthrax attack or severe 
pandemic influenza outbreak.48 
Lastly, involving LEP and deaf and hard-of-hearing groups in discussion and 
operations-based exercises provides meaningful data from which to design, evaluate, and 
measure performance activities outside of actual response missions.49 The funding 
allocations will provide for translation and interpreter services for exercise events, as well 
as meetings, conferences, or other engagement opportunities with representatives of these 
and other groups. Furthermore, the after action report/improvement plans (AAR/IPs) 
provide a short- and long-term roadmap for local, state, and federal policy makers to base 
decisions for current and future budget periods.  
To plan and respond most effectively to outbreaks or bioterrorism incidents, 
public health and healthcare practitioners must recognize and account for challenges or 
barriers that exist within their jurisdictions. Language barriers certainly pose a significant 
challenge to public health and healthcare preparedness goals, such as those associated 
with the dispensing of emergency antibiotics. In a bioterrorism incident, such as the 
release of anthrax, the goal of the public health workforce is to ensure entire populations 
receive emergency medications within 48 hours. If linguistic barriers are considered a 
priority, planners and responders working in public health, healthcare, and other partner 
organizations may lessen the otherwise unanticipated, unknown, and increased number of 
impacted individuals as a result of a bioterrorism incident or other emerging health threat 
impacting communities.  
Language barriers alone represent a significant socioeconomic challenge in the 
response to varied health emergencies. The next chapter examines how cultural barriers 
further impede response to emerging public health threats across the homeland.  
                                                 
48 “Partner Communications and Alerting (PCA) Portal,” accessed November 21, 2015, https://www. 
dhs.wisconsin.gov/pca/index.htm.  
49 Elaine Pittman, “How to Include Diverse, Vulnerable Populations in Emergency Preparedness,” 
Emergency Management, April 11, 2011, http://www.emergencymgmt.com/disaster/Diverse-Vulnerable-
Populations-Preparedness-041111.html.  
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III. CULTURAL BARRIERS 
A. BACKGROUND 
This chapter discusses cultural barriers and the association and relevance to 
emergencies. Many of the examples come from the Hurricane Katrina emergency 
because an extensive literature has been published about the United States’ experiences 
with this crisis. Throughout history, let alone in recent events, evidence supports that 
those with socioeconomic barriers suffer effects of disasters and public health 
emergencies more than those without these barriers, as has been evidenced by 
earthquakes, wildfires, hurricanes, pandemics, and countless other events across the 
United States and around the world.50 Cultural barriers to public health threats and 
emergencies pose significant challenges at both the individual and community group 
level. These barriers pose challenges to culturally diverse populations as they impede 
their ability to respond to emergencies impacting their communities.51  
During health emergencies, initiating and executing a culturally competent 
preparedness strategy is critical.52 Although important, planners and practitioners may 
face challenges to developing a meaningful culturally competent plan. These barriers 
include inadequate funding to strengthen community outreach efforts and limited or non-
existent collaboration between jurisdictions, departments, and varied disciplines. These 
partnerships are essential to help ensure a culturally competent, multi-disciplinary 
approach is taken in response to emergent events.53 
                                                 
50 Dennis Andrulis, Nadia Siddiqui, and Jonathan Purtle, California’s Emergency Preparedness 
Efforts for Culturally Diverse Communities: Status, Challenges and Directions for the Future 






B. CULTURAL BARRIERS AND ROUTINE HEALTH EMERGENCIES  
Evidence supports that barriers exist for certain minority groups needing 
healthcare in emergent situations other than natural or manmade disasters. According to 
the American Heart Association, AHA, over 350,000 cases of cardiac related incidents 
occurred outside of healthcare or hospital settings with an incredible low survival rate at 
only “9.5 percent” in impoverished neighborhoods because bystanders were unwilling to 
call 911 for assistance. However, in surrounding wealthier communities, the survival rate 
was over 40 percent given that bystanders were willing to perform cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation (CPR), as well as call 911 for assistance.54 Research suggests that fear and 
distrust of having government response personnel being called into certain culturally 
diverse neighborhoods plays a part in this unfortunate dynamic. The AHA found that 
Latinos are less inclined than whites to call 911 for assistance and—along with African 
Americans—are 30 percent less likely to have someone perform life-saving CPR should 
they suffer from cardiac arrest.55 The international science journal, Annals of Emergency 
Medicine, found that numerous factors including socioeconomic status and fear or 
distrust of law enforcement or other government entities served as the reasons behind 
these trends.56  
“Residents of low-income, minority neighborhoods have two strikes against them: 
The incidence of out-of-hospital cardiac arrest is much higher than average and rates of 
bystander CPR are below average,” states Dr. Comilla Sasson, an assistant professor at 
the University of Colorado School of Medicine.57 A survey was conducted in the summer 
2012 in Denver, Colorado comprised of subjects from five culturally diverse 
neighborhoods. Survey participants shared they were less likely to dial 911 during a 
cardiac episode out of fear associated to varied but interwoven factors including: distrust 
                                                 
54 John Fischer, “Cultural Barriers Keep People of Color from Calling an Ambulance,” Medical Daily, 






in police forces, becoming involved in violence, and governmental challenges of their 
immigration statuses.58  
C. CULTURE AND THE LINK TO SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH  
One area that has often been overlooked by researchers is the connection between 
the SDoH and culture.59 It is widely known that people respond to emergent situations in 
a “fight or flight” manner when they feel threatened, but how individual or group actions 
are displayed can be linked to SDoH factors.60 These factors include but are not limited 
to language, culture, historical trauma, fear, distrust, health literacy, and a lack of 
transportation options. These linkages are important when considering an individual’s 
willingness to accept, let alone have access to, government managed disaster relief.61  
According to Rutgers University, when discussing culture, it is necessary to be 
mindful that every culture experiences variances and to avoid stereotyping any group.62 
Also important to account for is that not everyone feels as safe and comfortable as those 
entrenched in the stereotypical American culture. Culture has complexities and the time 
spent in American culture varies.63 The life experiences of a 1st generation immigrant 
who arrived to the United States as an adult responds quite differently from an immigrant 
who arrived in the United States as a child and grew up in American culture or 
individuals who are 2nd or 3rd generation individuals. It is no different from how all 
individuals have unique perspectives, personalities, and experiences that have shaped 
their lives, which is the situation for those with varied cultural backgrounds.64 
It is important to define what is meant by culture and the outcomes and reactions 
associated within this context. Many definitions can be found when searching “culture,” 
                                                 
58 Fischer, “Cultural Barriers Keep People of Color from Calling an Ambulance.” 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 New Jersey Preparedness Training Consortium, Cultural Impact Overview (New Jersey: New Jersey 






and according to some in the nursing field, culture is defined as “the learned and 
transmitted knowledge of values, beliefs and lifestyles of a particular group that are 
generally transmitted inter-generationally and influence thinking, decisions and actions in 
patterned ways.”65 The next chapter, “Historical Trauma” explores this topic in depth.  
D. WHY IS CULTURE IMPORTANT IN AN EMERGENCY? 
The Rutgers study, referenced earlier, identified four primary factors that help 
explain the importance and significance of cultures during emergency response 
situations:66 
• Culture plays a bit part in how people prepare, respond, and recover from 
emergencies. As planners and responders, it is necessary to understand 
that some cultures are more emotive than others and their sensitivities may 
interrupt or delay response or relief efforts.67 Historical trauma presents 
unique and significant barriers given some may have been victimized in 
the past. Also relevant is the fact that some cultures are used to taking care 
of themselves and their families and deem it disgraceful to be provided 
assistance from governmental programs.68 
• Culture is about family and a certain comfort and a sense of reassurance is 
provided when all together and especially in times of emergencies.69 
Cultures have tight bonds within their community groups. It is within 
these interwoven connections where unity and a sense of control over 
emergent situations, such as health emergencies exist. Inner cultural 
community connections provide a level of unmatched social support that 
“outsiders” may not understand, comprehend, or appreciate.70 
Communities impacted by emergencies, particularly culturally diverse 
communities, rely on each other for support, security, and healing. For this 
reason, it is so important to get families reunited with their loved ones as 
soon as possible to allow the healing and rebuilding to begin following the 
impacts of a tragic event.71 
                                                 
65 “Transcultural Nursing,” accessed January 19, 2017, http://currentnursing.com/nursing_theory/ 
transcultural_nursing.html.  







• As referenced earlier in this chapter, culture incorporates values, beliefs, 
and lifestyles and defines the makeup of a culturally-diverse community.72 
Cultures relate to what this nation and its peers consider “appropriate 
behavior” and provide an “in-group” with others of a similar ethnicity, 
which contributes to a shared approach or sense of recovery for those 
living within a shared community impacted in disasters.73 No one wants to 
be alone and a community provides more than housing and services; it 
provides a shared identify that is extremely important for racial and ethnic 
minority groups.74 The support system that exists in minority communities 
may provide the best opportunity for individuals and families to survive 
emergent events given their strong social support functions and the trust 
that exists within its community members.75 
• As referenced earlier, historical trauma (described in detail in the 
following chapter) needs to be considered when discussing cultural 
challenges in emergencies.76 Although significant strengths exist within a 
culturally-interwoven community, some groups may still be more 
vulnerable than others. Immigrants new to the United States may not have 
the means, literacy, or “understanding of cultural norms” to take necessary 
actions to survive emergencies in the homeland. Many populations have a 
multitude of challenges and socioeconomic barriers in their lives (many 
associated to the SDoH).77 In health or other emergencies, these factors 
are likely to impact them more adversely than those who have lived a life 
without these challenges. Past experiences (and the historical trauma 
related to them) have significant consequences in emergencies. Minority 
groups that have deep feelings of fear and distrust of government and 
government programs may refuse assistance before, during, or following a 
health emergency or disaster event.78 Another important factor related to 
cultural barriers in emergencies is that some populations may be unaware 
that government assistance is offered to them following disasters.79 This 
factor further supports the argument that a significant amount of 
community outreach and engagement is required by public health 
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practitioners and their partners, before emergencies occur, to minimize the 
consequences that stem from varied disasters.80  
As evidenced from AAR written as a result of Hurricane Katrina, economic 
inequality prevents some populations from accessing critical life-saving resources.81 For 
example, in New Orleans, many of the individuals and families hit the hardest lived in the 
most hazardous, unsafe, and least desirable areas of the city, and their homes were 
substandard as opposed to those living in higher income, neighboring areas of Lower 
Ward 9.82 These findings support that minority groups living in impoverished areas will 
be impacted worse than others in living outside of these conditions. It is critical that 
government agencies work harder to ensure that racial and ethnic minority groups are 
familiar with assistance programs, transportation options, and varied mental health 
programs to minimize impacts, such as those experienced during Hurricane Katrina.83  
E. GIGER AND DAVIDHIZAR TRANSCULTURAL ASSESSMENT MODEL  
One way for public health and healthcare practitioners to evaluate and develop 
strategies to address cultural barriers is by using “Giger and Davidhizar’s Transcultural 
Assessment and Intervention Model,” as shown in Figure 1.84 The model was originally 
developed to assist nurses striving to strengthen and understand cultural diversity and has 
been adopted by several public health professionals and healthcare service practitioners, 
broadly. The model is regarded as a strategy and tool to help assist practitioners in their 
efforts to provide disaster crisis counseling with entire populations, as it intersects two 
critical factors; culturally competency, and a respect of diversity.85 The GDTAM is based 
on six particular principles focused on providing the best healthcare possible to diverse, 
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cultural groups.86 GDTAM is based on the principle that cultures are unique and 
individuals should be assessed according to: “(1) communication, (2) space, (3) social 
organization, (4) time, (5) environmental control, and (6) biological variations.”87 
 
Figure 1.  Giger and Davidhizar’s Transcultural Assessment Model.88  
1. Cultural Communications  
Unlike language barriers discussed in Chapter II, cultural communications include 
both verbal and nonverbal communications common in an individual’s culture and 
environment.89 Not surprisingly, communications often presents one of the most 
significant challenges for those working to assist others from diverse cultural 
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backgrounds, particularly in disasters.90 Communication is important to cultures and is 
the basis for how populations interact and behave as they work to preserve their cultural 
origins.91 
2. Space 
Giger and Davidhizar reference “space” as the distance that exists between 
individuals when they converse or interact.92 In all cultures, communication occurs 
within the confines of space. Within the GDTAM, four particular “zones” are related to 
the interpersonal space that needs to be considered in response to public health or other 
emergencies: “intimate, personal, social and consultative and public.”93 “Rules” that 
pertain to a comfortable personal distance vary between cultures, as do the attitudes 
towards an individual’s “personal area.” Furthermore, people have their own perspective 
and comfort level related to what they consider their “personal and/or intimate space.”94 
It is easy to understand that when a person’s personal space is challenged (in any culture), 
a sense of discomfort can occur, and for public health and healthcare providers working 
in emergencies, the consequences include further damaging trust, an individual refusing 
critical care, or that person not returning for essential treatment or further care.95 With 
some vaccines and antibiotics distributed and dispensed by government health agencies 
or healthcare entities, multi-dose prophylaxis or treatment is essential in the prevention or 
recovery from certain deadly exposures; thus, this latter phenomenon is just as important 
as the “first refusal of care.”96 
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3. Social Organization  
The GDMA model cites social organization as “the manner in which a cultural 
group organizes itself around the trusted family group.” Social aspects, such as family 
backgrounds, religious values, and beliefs, and the role within the family may all relate to 
ethnicity and culture, and are certainly germane before, during, and after health related or 
other emergencies occur.97 
4. Time 
As time is relevant in many aspects of everyone’s lives; according to Giger and 
Davidhizar, it is also important in terms of “interpersonal communication.”98 Time must 
be respected in this context given certain groups can either be “past, present, or future 
oriented.”99 For example, preventative healthcare requires a certain level of “buy-in” and 
understanding of the benefits given the rewards of preventative care are “future oriented.” 
The rewards and benefits, as described, can only happen through enhanced and dedicated 
community outreach with racial and culturally diverse populations prior to emergent 
situations taking place.100 
5. Environmental Control  
Giger and Davidhizar describe the environmental control as the “ability of the 
person to control nature and to plan and direct factors in the environment that affect 
them.”101 Americans believe that they will seek healthcare when they need it and that 
they are in control of the nature or reasons behind the healthcare visits, which is not 
always the case for people from varied cultural groups. These groups do not experience 
as “strong of a belief in internal control” but do have a “greater belief in external 
influences.”102 As a result, some view healthcare or other emergency care as “useless or 
                                                 







futile” and these attitudes or viewpoints certainly present challenges to practitioners 
looking to provide assistance in response to bioterrorism or other health emergencies 
impacting the homeland.103 
6. Biological Variances  
Lastly, Giger and Davidhizer note “there is as much diversity within cultural and 
racial groups as there is across cultural and racial groups.”104 It is important for public 
health and healthcare practitioners to gain a better understanding of the cultural datasets 
and relevant biological variances relevant to varied cultural groups within 
communities.105 This understanding serves as a perfect “starting point” for practitioners 
looking to provide “culturally appropriate care” in response to varied disasters and health 
emergencies.106 
F. RACE, CULTURE, AND HURRICANE KATRINA  
It is well documented that both race and culture have had severe impacts in 
response to emergencies, as was the case before, during, and after the Hurricane Katrina 
disaster.107 Everyone remembers the horrific video clips and photographs of African 
American victims following the event. Socioeconomic barriers were evident and the 
racial disparities among groups provoked numerous debates regarding difficult public 
policy steps to address the areas oppressed racial history that separated their community 
populations.108  
At one point, New Orleans City Councilman Oliver Thomas said that first 
responders were too fearful of African American people to “go in and save them” and the 
reports of violence, looting, and shootings created fear in people that may otherwise have 
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provided sheltering or assistance.109 He said that many of the populations were being 
portrayed as “thugs and thieves.”110 One woman waiting to find shelter said, “…if we 
were lucky, we would have died.”111 Also, CBS News reported that many minority  
members of Congress expressed anger and frustration and said they felt the government 
responded slowly in assisting African Americans during Hurricane Katrina.112  
The connection between races and cultures, and perceptions of fair and equal 
treatment, were apparent during and after the hurricane event. Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice, the most prominent African American person in the Bush 
administration, downplayed the criticism of news reports speaking to the differing 
treatment of populations during the disaster saying: “Americans would somehow in a 
color-affected way decide who to help and who not to help, I, just don’t believe it.”113 In 
the same interview she shared, “the African-American community has obviously been 
very heavily affected. But people are doing what they can for Americans. Nobody wants 
to see any American suffer.”114 
Although some members of Congress “blamed” personnel for poorly executed 
response missions, CBS News reports that many populations having discussions in their 
restaurants, businesses, and homes (as well as via radio programs and social media) 
viewed the response as political.115 Although situations in which any group or population 
is completely unified with an opinion or emotion rarely occur, many African Americans 
continue to be angry about the event and outraged at the how their family and community 
members were left behind in New Orleans and the lack of priority to rescue them as a 
result of the hurricane.116 “Black people are mad because they feel the reason for the 
slow response is because those people are black and they didn’t support George Bush,” 
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said Ron Walters, a professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland. 
“And I don’t expect that feeling to go away anytime soon.”117 As trust serves at the 
center of government operations with the public, it was certainly tested with some 
populations during Hurricane Katrina. Some consider that “Blacks Lives Matter” 
stemmed from this disaster.118 
As Jamelle Bouie explained in his 2015 article, “Where Black Lives Matter 
Began”, he feels that while the government could not stop the hurricane itself, it could 
have done more but did not to prepare the hardest hit areas of New Orleans prior to the 
event.119 Evidence supports that Hurricane Katrina was one of the worst disasters in U.S. 
history. It was an event that claimed the lives of over 1,800 Americans in addition to 
driving tens of thousands from their homes.120 In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 
New Orleans was marked with “scandalous mismanagement” and both response and 
elected personnel were deemed both incompetent and insensitive.121 The multitude of 
residents who were not rescued and brought to safe areas needed to deal with both 
inadequate aid and a lack of shelter, and according to Bouie, many people in the hardest 
hit areas of New Orleans were “abandoned by officials” and were unable or perhaps 
unwilling to help them.122 Whether realities or perceptions, the results or lack of results 
of this country’s response actions have consequences, such as fear and distrust, and 
directly relate to future response missions. U.S. history and how it impacts this nation’s 
future is discussed at length in the next chapter of this thesis. 
G. LESSONS LEARNED FROM HURRICANE KATRINA  
To continue to move forward and bridge the gap that cultural barriers present 
during emergencies, it is necessary to incorporate and build-on the lessons-learned into 
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public health emergency preparedness (PHEP) planning, which begins by examining the 
incident and working to respect the social dynamics connected to the disaster. In an 
article written to Health Affairs by Dr. Dennis Andrulis, of the Texas Health Institute, he 
argued that the tragedy of Hurricane Katrina provided a realistic example of what 
happens when socioeconomic barriers are not integrated into local, state, and federal 
government “preparedness planning and execution.”123 In his article, he noted that 
disadvantaged, poor, and ethnic minorities suffered “disproportionate magnitudes of 
destruction, injury, disease, and death.”124 Many sources note the most damaged areas in 
New Orleans were primarily populated by low-income African Americans. As noted 
earlier, many of the most impacted areas had substandard housing and lacked 
transportation options essential for evacuation. Further contributing to these problems 
were many of those eventually impacted did not evacuate prior to the storm given the 
limited, inconsistent, or no evacuation orders or distrust in government personnel tasked 
with executing emergency evacuation missions.125  
Dr. Andrulis also reported that Latinos and Asian Americans also faced similar 
challenges during Hurricane Katrina.126 Barriers, such as “language, culture, and their 
status as undocumented or uninsured residents,” compounded impacts of Hurricane 
Katrina for certain populations.127 Practitioners need to incorporate factors, such as 
culture, language, literacy, historical trauma, and distrust to help strengthen their 
approaches to emergent events, as these factors are likely to be a significant part of 
achieving incident response objectives.128 More research and analysis is needed, 
however, to determine the extent to which “public health preparedness research, 
programs, and policies address these factors as integral components of preparedness.”129 
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A study was conducted in 2007 to assess progress in addressing gaps stemming from 
Hurricane Katrina. Five general themes emerged to assist policy and decision makers to 
thwart impacts that future events will present. These five areas include (1) emergency 
risk communication, (2) training and education, (3) resource guides for planners and 
responders, (4) measurement and evaluation, and (5) policy and program initiatives.130 
The results of those themes are as follows. 
1. Emergency Risk Communication 
Dr. Andrulis references a study conducted in 2007, which reported that 
increasingly more government and private organizations have distributed emergency 
preparedness and response information to their culturally diverse populations, particularly 
through translated resource.131 The issue remains however that few of the current 
program priorities address the needs of health literacy government distrust. The study 
discussed the importance of developing community partnerships, and using other trusted 
venues to reach these populations, but most of the resources and information needed 
would be via the internet.132 The problem space, unfortunately, is that many racial and 
ethnic groups fail to have access to these resources or have limited computer skills 
needed to access critical information, let alone that most of the information is only in 
English.133 
2. Training and Education  
More training and education resources have become available related to race, 
ethnicity, and culture since the months following Hurricane Katrina.134 Preparedness 
programs working under the CDC umbrella, for example, are providing “cultural 
competency” related courses, workshops, seminars, and training sessions marketed 
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towards a variety of populations. Although these training sessions have helped, the study 
pointed out that the training offerings were short-lived and at the introductory levels only. 
To address these gaps and ensure population-specific significance, some community-
based organizations have offered culture-specific, practical programs.135 To provide an 
example of successful local-level engagement and outreach, in San Francisco, the 
Chinese Health Coalition (CHC) established a Chinatown Disaster Response Program to 
train their community volunteers in incident management and empower community 
groups to “prepare for independent survival.”136 
3. Response Guides  
The CDC established a workgroup tasked with providing guidance to local, state, 
and tribal public health preparedness planners to help them in their efforts to define, 
locate, and reach minority populations in disasters.137 In Wisconsin, as with many states, 
hazard vulnerability assessments (HVAs) are conducted to evaluate major racial and 
ethnic group risks, varied spoken languages, preferred emergency messaging options, and 
overall barriers that may exist within their culturally-diverse communities. Although 
these practices offer guidance and recommendations for planning and responding to a 
wide-range of emergencies, such as Hurricane Katrina, questions remain as to the specific 
coordination, responsibility, and accountability of practitioners working in health 
emergencies.138  
4. Measurement and Evaluation 
Although many local and state jurisdictions have metrics, broadly, for emergency 
preparedness, standardized criteria is still lacking that consistency and accurately 
addresses the specific needs of minority populations within the CDC PHEP 
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framework.139 Over the years, the CDC has created, distributed, and revised local and 
state capability assessments intended to gauge a health jurisdiction’s ability to respond to 
a bioterrorism or other public health threat impacting minority populations; however, 
these measurement and evaluation tools, such as the CRI annual assessments of 
metropolitan jurisdictions, do not assess other major socioeconomic barriers or other 
germane challenges, such as culture, health literacy, and government distrust.140  
5. Policy and Program Initiatives 
Research supports that preparedness plans, policies, and procedures dedicated to 
community outreach and engagement in minority communities have historically been 
lacking.141 Progress continues to be made, however, evidenced by the efforts of the 
Office of Minority Health (OMH) located at the Department of Health and Human 
Services.142 They have provided CLAS trainings to local and state emergency managers 
and health professionals tasked with assisting Latino populations impacted in health of 
other emergent events.143 Following the tragic events of both 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, 
local and state health agencies have made some progress with their racial and ethnic 
partners. Outreach efforts include but are not limited to identifying barriers to 
communications, opportunities for collaboration, preferred content areas on preparedness, 
and preferred communication channels.144 
H. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
The field of public health emergency response is fluid and dynamic.145 Public 
health practitioners need to continue to dedicate efforts to involve their racial and ethnic 
community leaders in varied emergency planning priorities to respond better to events, 
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such as pandemic influenza, Ebola and Zika viruses, and other outbreaks and 
emergencies to gain perspectives based on their community partner suggestions “from the 
field.”146 Continuing to partner with and draw from the experiences and expertise of 
minority organizations will further strengthen public health emergency preparedness 
goals across the country.147 “Bridging the gap” by dedicating time, money, and efforts to 
engage with culturally diverse populations will help build trust and strengthen public 
health planning and response initiatives and policies needed to protect all populations in 
the homeland. 
This chapter has discussed how cultural barriers present significant challenges to 
response missions stemming from bioterrorism incidents or emerging health threats. The 
following chapter, Historical Trauma, describes how fear, distrust, and past actions of 
government can impact future health emergencies. The relevance of these psychological 
realities is a predicted increase in morbidity and mortality rates across U.S. populations 
as a result of an attack or infectious disease outbreak.  
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IV. HISTORICAL TRAUMA 
“While in some ways, individual trauma affects people in a fairly universal 
manner, historical trauma that has not been addressed will shape the way people respond 
to current traumatic experiences.”148 Another critical socioeconomic barrier deals with 
historical trauma. This chapter explores and describes how traumatic experiences of the 
past directly associate to future public health response outcomes. A particular focus is 
placed on Native American, African American, Asian American, and Puerto Rican 
historical situations, experiences, and dynamics that must be considered and respected by 
public health emergency preparedness practitioners and their partners looking to 
strengthen response plans. Dr. Michelle Sotero from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
describes the conceptual model of historical trauma as “a way to help public health 
practitioners and researchers gain a broader perspective of health disparities and aid in 
the development of new approaches for improving the health status of racial/ethnic 
populations in the United States.”149 The model, described, allows for the increased 
probability of survival in health emergencies or natural disasters.150  
A. INTRODUCTION 
According to Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services, SAMHSA, 
“Historical Trauma is a form of trauma that impacts entire communities. It refers to the 
cumulative emotional and psychological wounding, as a result of group traumatic 
experiences that is transmitted across generations within a community.”151 Historic 
events and multi-generational traumatic experiences within diverse populations has had 
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consequences been known to alter response missions to varied events.152 Furthermore, 
“unresolved grief and anger” often go together with this type of trauma and are often 
partnered with varied physical, mental, and behavioral health disorders.153 Researchers at 
SAMHSA go on to say, “this type of trauma is often associated with racial and ethnic 
population groups in the United States who have suffered major intergenerational losses 
and assaults on their culture and well-being.”154  
Native Americans have experienced significant traumatic events throughout their 
history.155 The following section describes some of those instances and how they relate 
to current health emergency planning and response objectives. 
B. HISTORICAL TRAUMA: NATIVE AMERICANS  
With respect to Native Americans, a report from SAMHSA tells us, “This 
population has been exposed to generations of violent colonization, assimilation policies, 
and general loss.”156 Due to this loss, people with Native American backgrounds have 
suffered and had attacks on their people, their cultures, and their long-standing 
traditions.157 The impacts that historical trauma has had on Native American populations 
can be found in a variety of areas, such as the changing of the ways they raise their 
children, dramatic changes to their family structure, and overall, the deterioration of the 
inter-tribal relationships between one another.158 Additionally, Native American’s have 
higher rates of health risk factors that public health and healthcare practitioners must be 
aware of when striving to understand the historical trauma factors that exist within Indian 
country. These factors include overall poor physical and emotional health, low self-
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esteem, depression, substance abuse, and higher rates of suicide than with other 
populations.159 As referenced earlier, historical trauma has negatively impacted the 
“sense of community within the tribe itself.”160 These issues, coupled with distrust of 
“outsiders” and government entities based on experiences as described in this chapter, 
have created significant barriers that must be addressed.161 
History has taught people that some soldiers have experienced what medical 
personnel call “shell shock.”162 What was unclear for practitioners was how to care for 
the condition, let alone characterize it as an actual “disorder or disease.”163 Researchers 
now understand that survivors of traumatic experiences, such as torture, rape, and 
emergencies have shared or similar symptoms as soldiers who have experienced “shell 
shock” and that traumatic events bring “intense fear, helplessness, or horror.”164 In the 
fall and bitterly cold winter between 1838 and 1839, thousands of people from the 
Cherokee tribe were forcibly marched 800 miles from the southeastern United States to 
an area west of the Mississippi River where over 4,000 of 18,000 died. This historic event 
became known as the “Trail of Tears.”165 It can be assumed that they felt the same 
“intense fear, helplessness and horror” given the accounts of the event and perhaps every 
tribe in the United States has their own story of both “relocation and warfare” and 
continue to deal with their own anxieties stemming from varied events impacting 
populations of Indian country.166  
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C. FORCED STERILIZATION IN NATIVE AMERICAN WOMEN 
Before delving into the sterilization topic within this chapter, it is important to 
note the significance involved, overall, of Native American women and the psychological 
and physical trauma they have endured. A report released by the Department of Justice, 
American Indians and Crime, found that “Native American women suffer violent crime 
at a rate three and a half times greater than the national average.”167 Researchers across 
the country estimate that this statistic is in actuality low given that over 70 percent of 
these types of assaults are rarely if ever reported.168 It can be assumed that traumatic 
experiences, such as forced sterilization amongst Native American women directly 
associates to the trust, or more importantly, lack of trust in government officials to carry 
out their response missions in health emergencies or natural disasters, which coupled 
with abuses, creates a significant psycho-socio barrier between ethnicities.  
Under the banner of public health, U.S. policy at the turn of the 20th century 
empowered the government to sterilize “unwilling and unwitting people.”169 Currently 
applicable in 30 states, the laws and policies list attributes, such as the mentally insane, 
feeble-minded, overly dependent, or diseased, and have deemed some Native American 
women as “incapable of regulating their own reproductive abilities.”170 These laws and 
policies have justified U.S. “government-forced” sterilizations of women including those 
from Native American descent.171 Government forced sterilizations across certain 
populations in U.S. history has led to further exploitations and created divisions among 
racial and ethnic groups in the United States. It is these types of actions of the past that 
account for the fear and distrust of government; fear that continues to exist within U.S. 
communities to this day.172  
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Evidence supports that between the late 1960s and the early 1970s, over 40 
percent of all Native American women of childbearing age had been medically sterilized 
without their consent.173 These procedures were conducted by the federally funded 
“Indian Health Service” (IHS), which was managed at that time by the “Bureau of Indian 
Affairs” (BIA).174 It is reported that the sterilization program events being conducted 
were uncovered by members of the American Indian Movement (AIM) while employed 
at the “BIA headquarters” in 1972.175 
An abnormally large percentage of American Indian women were sterilized in the 
1970s and the government played an important role in the initiation of this sterilization 
campaign.176 This role is of additional importance because government officials have the 
responsibility to act in the best interests of the tribe with the end result being equalization 
of socio-economic status and increased sovereignty for the tribes.177 Clearly, the 
government violated this responsibility through the initiation of this sterilization 
campaign that was deemed a calculated, genocidal assault on the American Indian 
population.178  
The forced sterilization of Native American women are still felt within tribes 
today and is deemed yet another chapter in the long book of abuses and traumatic events 
against native people at the hands of the U.S. government.179 It will take both oversight 
and care by public health and healthcare practitioners and members of the general public 
to help mend these injustices against Native American people but it is essential to 
                                                 
173 Krase, “History of Forced Sterilization and Current U.S. Abuses.” 
174 Ibid. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Tyler Bailey, “Issues in American Indian Health,” University of Minnesota Duluth, accessed 
November 9, 2016, http://www.d.umn.edu/cla/faculty/tbacig/studproj/is3099/nahealth/paper.html. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Jane Lawrence, “The Little-Known History of the Forced Sterilization of Native American 
Women,” JSTOR Daily 24, no. 3 (Summer 2000): 400–419, http://daily.jstor.org/the-little-known-history-
of-the-forced-sterilization-of-native-american-women/. 
 42 
understand it is likely this nation may never be forgiven for the horrific events 
perpetrated against them all in “the name of public health.”180  
To prepare better for emerging public health threats and natural disasters 
impacting Native Americans, practitioners must not only have an appreciation for 
historical trauma but a plan for addressing gaps that may exist to help ensure survival in 
emergencies, and the first step is tailoring the response efforts to the experiences of the 
tribal community.181 Past experiences of violence and cultural degradation increase the 
likelihood of fear and mistrust of responders outside of the tribal populations.182  
It is essential that public health practitioners and their partners remember that 
Americans are guests in sovereign nations and need to show respect for Native American 
culture.183 Working to establish relationships with tribal liaisons, emergency 
management liaisons, or spiritual leaders will help establish or strengthen trust while 
increasing U.S. credibility as practitioners working with Native American populations.184 
It does not happen overnight. As referenced earlier, these traumatic experiences run deep 
and although it can be hoped that trust can be established, it may be necessary to 
understand that Americans may always be seen as “outsiders” and that their intentions are 
not honest or meaningful.185 Thus, efforts must focus on nurturing and strengthening 
relationships with this nation’s Native American people, relationships that have been 
damaged. This country must help “bridge the gap,” which health professionals have 
contributed to, through experiences linked to historical trauma.186 While disagreements 
may arise with the “beliefs and customs” of the tribe or tribes impacted in health or other 
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emergencies, it is critical that practitioners are respectful and mindful of Native American 
“choices, culture, and values.”187  
D. HISTORICAL TRAUMA: AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE 
“TUSKEGEE STUDY” 
Native American populations have certainly suffered their fair share of trauma 
throughout their proud history but so have African Americans. The “Tuskegee Study” 
serves as an example of those traumatic experiences and is among the most often cited 
reasons for mistrust of medical care among African Americans.188 The United States 
Public Health Service (USPHS) conducted the study focused on the progression of 
untreated syphilis in African American men. Government officials convinced the men 
that they were “receiving free healthcare when in reality they were being tested on like 
lab rats.”189 The Tuskegee Study took place in Macon County, Alabama.190 Researchers 
have summarized the experiment as an “unethical and deadly experiment,” which was 
one of the most “egregious examples of medical exploitation in United States history.”191  
For 40 years, between 1932 and 1972, the USPHS conducted experiments with 
hundreds of poor, African American men—the majority who were suffering from 
syphilis—to understand better the natural progression and “history of the disease.”192 
During this event, the men were denied the required and essential treatment for their 
condition, which included being provided penicillin that became a standard healthcare 
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practice by the mid-1940s.193 Not only were the men denied treatments, they were 
instructed not to seek the medical advice from any healthcare providers except the 
medical staff assigned to the study.194 The men were exposed to “blood draws, spinal 
taps, and, eventually, autopsies, by the study’s primarily white medical staff.”195 The 
men who were able to survive the study later reported that medical staff informed them 
that they had “bad blood” that required medical treatment.196 For their participation, the 
men were provided hot meals, the appearance of relevant treatment, and funeral 
arrangements including burial costs. Jean Heller, of the Associated Press, provided 
details about the event in 1972.197 The report described the deception involved with the 
study and the relationship to government-justified medical procedures (or the denial of 
healthcare) for the men involved in the event.198 The issue was, by the time the report 
was released in 1972, most of men had died mostly from “syphilis-related causes.”199 
Historical trauma has varied consequences and one of those is distrust. This 
governmental distrust impedes health practitioner’s response to emerging threats. African 
Americans have dealt with traumatic experiences that impact trust and the “Tuskegee 
Study” serves as one of the prime examples.  
Since the experiment, various public health researchers have noticed that when 
they interview African-Americans about their views on the health system, they will often 
bring up Tuskegee, unprompted. It left a deep scar on the country, yes, but on this 
population, in particular.200 It is understandable, when surveyed, that many responded of 
their distrust in doctors, and particularly white doctors, which is easy to understand when 
the government allowed something this awful to happen.201  
                                                 










As discussed earlier, historical trauma carries across generations and mistrust that 
stems from situations directly or indirectly experienced should be considered. In 
December 1974, federal government officials agreed to pay $37,000 to any of the men 
who may have survived the study, as well as provided them with “lifetime medical 
benefits.”202 This “benefit” extended to their family members who may have also 
contracted illnesses related to syphilis.203 Furthermore, government officials agreed to 
award $15,000 to the heirs of the men involved in the study.204 Although the 
government felt they were working to “remedy the harms” committed during the 
Tuskegee experiments, officials failed to accept responsibility for their actions.205 
Decades later, in 1997, President Bill Clinton expressed a formal apology to the men and 
family members involved with the study, as well as to the “nation at large.”206 Outside of 
President Clinton’s apology, it was the only circumstance where any government official 
or agency acknowledged its role in “the longest non-therapeutic experiment on human 
beings in medical history.”207 
As important and genuine President Clinton’s address, the sad fact was it was too 
late for just a “simple apology.”208 The truth was government-managed health officials 
had committed “gross injustices against members of the African-American 
community.”209 By the time of the apology, populations across the country were 
overcome with widespread “distrust and suspicion” toward government officials, as 
well as those working in public health, healthcare, and medical professions.210 
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Significant research on the Tuskegee Experiment has been conducted by Marcella 
Alsan (Stanford Medical School) and Marianne Wanamaker (University of Tennessee) 
who contend that barriers and distrust still exist. In one publication, Dr. Alsan recalls 
being approached by a woman who recounted that she was eight years old after the 
Tuskegee Study when her family stopped going to her regular pediatrician. They decided 
to drive an hour to see a black doctor instead of having her continue to be seen by a white 
doctor.211 Their research supports that a distrust of government and government managed 
healthcare still exists in black communities today which, in emergencies, present barriers. 
Understanding past experiences, such as Tuskegee, is important for practitioners working 
to establish and refine guidelines related to the medical ethics involved in caring for 
certain populations, particularly, as public health and healthcare practices continue to 
evolve in “the digital and genomic ages.”212  
E. HISTORICAL TRAUMA: ASIAN AMERICANS  
Historical trauma impacts many populations, including Asian Americans. Asian 
Americans refer to those people in the United States who have their origins in any of the 
original peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, or the Indian subcontinent (Cambodia, 
China, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippine Islands, Thailand, and 
Vietnam).213 Research supports that throughout U.S. history, racism has been prevalent 
towards Asian-Americans and Pacific Islanders.214 Examples of this racism, social 
injustice, and oppression at the hands of the government are explained in this section.  
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For many Asian-Americans and Pacific Islanders, the sense of unity and 
community exist given their population has collectively experienced discrimination.215 
For many years, behavioral health researchers have documented the dynamics of “trans-
generational psychological trauma” that exists among Asian-Americans and Pacific 
Islander populations.216 For example, it has been well documented that during World 
War II, many Japanese-American children were held in internment camps on U.S. soil, 
which led to life-long psychological trauma stemming from experiences they had during 
the wrongful imprisonment.217 The psychological impacts for these populations are 
compounded given many Asian-Americans and Pacific Islanders have relocated to the 
United States from “countries ravaged by war, famine, and economic and political 
upheaval.”218 As discussed earlier in this chapter, historical trauma is generational and 
although current generations may have not experienced the torture, rape, or other violent 
events bestowed upon their ancestors, the results of these psychologically traumatic 
incidents are passed down to them.219 It is important to note that although the examples 
of historical trauma previously referenced occurred from outside of the United States, the 
inherited fear and distrust of government is germane to the situation. 
F. ASIAN AMERICANS FEARING DEPORTATION 
As the world grapples with its response to the Syrian refugee crisis, the question 
of what to do with another refugee community in the United States remains up for debate. 
Since 1975, over 1.2 million refugees fled war in Southeast Asia and resettled in 
America, making them the largest refugee group in U.S. history.220 Despite their refugee 
status in the United States, some of those refugees, mostly those who were children or 
infants when they fled Asia, are being deported. More than 500 people have been 
deported from America to Cambodia since 2002 when the two countries signed a 
                                                 







repatriation agreement.221 Over the past two decades, more than 13,000 Cambodian, 
Vietnamese, and Laotian Americans have been served deportation orders, according to 
the Southeast Asia Resource Action Center. Advocates say those communities live in 
constant fear of being relocated from their homes.222 As refugees are sent back to 
countries from which they fled, some are saying that U.S. immigration policies are re-
traumatizing their communities.223 Struggling with post-traumatic stress disorder, and 
LEP, many refugees are vulnerable to poverty, crime, and violence.224  
When it comes to considering the deportation of a refugee, the United States bears 
moral responsibility, particularly for those displaced by conflict in which the United 
States was involved.225 The United States’ war in Vietnam, and the bombing of 
Cambodia, played a significant role in the “displacement of refugees” from Southeast 
Asia.226 As a result of this war, many were driven from their homes, without a choice, 
and left behind things many take for granted, such as language, culture, and the love, 
safety, and security that exists in U.S. families and across U.S. communities.227  
G. HISTORICAL TRAUMA: ASIAN AMERICANS AND INTERNMENT 
CAMPS 
Historical trauma within the Asian American population includes imprisonment 
on American soil as a result of World War II. In 1942, President Roosevelt instituted 
“Executive Order 9066.”228 Under this initiative, more than 120,000 people of Japanese 
descent residing in the United States were taken from their homes (and in most cases had 
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less than two days to do so) and relocated to government-managed internment camps.229 
The U.S. government condoned these actions by claiming that “there was a danger of 
those of Japanese descent spying for the Japanese.”230 The issue being, however, is that 
more than two thirds of those sent to the camps were American citizens with nearly half 
being children.231 Of those detained, none were ever deemed to be “disloyal to the 
nation” and in most cases, family members were simply split-up and placed in different 
camps.232 Evidence supports that over the entire war, only 10 individuals were found 
guilty of spying for Japan and all 10 persons were Caucasians.233 
U.S. history supports that some people have thought of the internment camps as 
“concentration camps” while others view internment as “an unfortunate event, but a 
military necessity.”234 In 1988, Congress supported “Public Law 100-383,” which 
recognized the “injustice of the internment,” issued apologies for the activities and gave a 
$20,000 cash payment to each confined individual.235 A stunning irony in the event was 
expressed by an internee who—when told that the Japanese were “put in those camps for 
their own protection”—answered, “If we were put there for our protection, why were the 
guns at the guard towers pointed inward, instead of outward?”236 It can be assumed in a 
bio-terrorism or other public health emergency—particularly those that require a 
prevalent local, state, and federal law enforcement presence—the fear of deportation or 
internment from historical trauma perspectives are realistic.  
                                                 










H. HISTORICAL TRAUMA: EXPERIMENTATION OF “THE PILL” ON 
PUERTO RICAN WOMEN 
Native Americans, African Americans, and Asian Americans and other 
populations have certainly experienced racial demotion in varying ways and degrees.237 
All populations must be treated with dignity and decency by both the government-based 
public health workforce and the healthcare and medical establishment; unfortunately, 
certain events have fostered distrust, discontent, and disconnect among certain 
populations.238 The following segment of this chapter provides examples of historic, 
unfortunate health-related events in Puerto Rico and their impacts on current-day public 
health and health care emergency planning and response practice. 
The initial trials of the contraceptive pill began 62 years ago, and some Puerto 
Rican women remember the low ethical standards associated to these experiments. 
Researchers have compared these activities with the syphilis experiments in Tuskegee, 
Alabama, mentioned earlier in this chapter, given these tests were taking place around the 
same time.239 
Scientists Gregory Pincus and John Rock began the first human trials of “the pill” 
in the United States (Massachusetts) in 1954.240 The trials were conducted under the 
guise of “fertility treatments not as birth experiments.” Further complicating the issue 
was the fact that the pill had severe side effects; thus, their difficulty in persuading U.S. 
women to participate in the trials. These and other challenges led the researchers to 
decide to target their tests to women living in Puerto Rico.241 As the testing commenced, 
the scientists were able to recruit hundreds of women to test the pill, which at that time 
had “three times more hormones” than today’s version that was later sold under the brand 
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name “Enovid.”242 Most of the Puerto Rican women in the study came from 
impoverished areas and deprived farming villages and had no idea that the study they 
were participating in was not also being conducted with women located on the United 
States mainland.243 U.S. doctors targeted the remote town of Humacao, Puerto Rico, for 
the testing, and bitter feelings continue to simmer given the secrecy of the experimental 
nature of the pills dispersed in that area.244 Some women recall doctors dressed in white 
lab coats who were once tasked with delivering their babies, only to later be the same 
physicians urging them to use the new drug.245 
As a result of the study, two healthy women perished and no autopsies were 
ordered to evaluate the cause of their deaths.246 Following the study, the pill was 
approved by the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) in 1960, but the Puerto Rican trials 
continued until 1964 because women in the United States were still suffering from side 
effects, such as “depression, acne and painful periods.”247 To this day, many Puerto 
Rican women continue to be outraged that they labeled “unwitting guinea pigs” by 
medical staff coming from the (mainland) United States. Research supports that the 
Puerto Rican women involved in the study were not informed that the pill was 
“experimental” or that “dangerous side effects” were likely.248 
After the experiments, FDA officials admitted that the early trials of the drug 
were conducted without “informed consent,” which is now mandatory and standard 
practice for new medications federally approved and distributed in the United States.249 
Evidence supports that although not apologizing for the way the trails were conducted, 
the FDA says that the experience resulted in “stronger rules” and served as the basis for a 
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law “requiring every participant to be fully informed of the scope of tests before agreeing 
to participate” in medical or healthcare-related studies.250  
I. HISTORICAL TRAUMA: MILITARY WEAPONS TESTING IN PUERTO 
RICO 
Governmental experiments leading to distrust and poor health outcomes amongst 
the Puerto Rican population is not isolated to “the pill.” Puerto Rico, a U.S. 
commonwealth, has historically been “subjected to abuse by foreign powers intent on 
exploiting its rich resources,” which involves activities just east off of the island called 
“Vieques.”251 
Over 100 years ago, in Puerto Rico, the United States executed a military 
government when it was held by the Spanish.252 Between 1941 and 2003, the U.S. 
military used the landmass of Vieques as “target practice,” which has resulted in negative 
health-related outcomes for the near 6,000 people living on the island.253 
In 2003, the U.S. Navy halted military operations on the island but left behind 
years of damage caused by “gunnery practice and test bombings.”254 Research supports 
that the consequences and realties stemming from these activities are severe. 
Furthermore, the health impacts are especially concerning given the cancer rates among 
islanders continue to increase and the ecological damage to the island, resulting in health 
issues, are still on the rise.255 For example, testing of weapons has occurred “containing 
various chemicals and heavy metals” known to be “detrimental to the public health” of 
populations living in Puerto Rico.256 Although illegal, evidence supports that U.S. 
soldiers have fired used uranium shells onto the island as part of their standard training 
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missions.257 The results of these trainings, however, pose serious health concerns given 
the abandoned shells eventually oxidize and release deadly radioactive materials that are 
carried throughout the region via wind and water.258 These materials pose a significant 
health risk once ingested by humans given their vulnerabilities to “large doses of 
radiation.”259 Research supports that the cancer rate of those living in Vieques to be “27 
percent higher” than those residing in any other part of Puerto Rico because of these 
activities.260  
Of particular alarm are the health concerns involved, and again, U.S. government 
distrust given the unprecedented testing of toxins in Puerto Rico, such as Agent 
Orange.261 It is well documented that the Navy tested the effects of Agent Orange on the 
island of Vieques during the Vietnam War.262 The agent has been blamed for numerous 
health issues including “birth defects in children,” whose mothers were exposed to the 
deadly chemical.263 Evidence supports that veterans who ingested Agent Orange during 
their deployments have faced increased rates of “cancer, nervous system disorders and 
respiratory problems” as a result of the exposures.264 On the island, research supports 
that Vieques residents report the following health issues: “high rates of asthma, skin 
problems, kidney failures and heart irregularities.”265  
In summary, populations living in Vieques have been exposed to decades of 
dangerous chemicals, frequently distributed by the U.S. Navy.266 Although the cases and 
health consequences of those activities continue to surface, the U.S. government will not 
                                                 











take responsibility.267 The Navy claims the “toxic contamination of Vieques” was not 
due to their military activities but the impacts are due to “natural geologic occurrences;” 
therefore, excusing them from any obligation to “clean up or provide medical assistance 
to residents.”268 A certain lawyer, representing many islanders in a lawsuit challenging 
the U.S. government, sums up the situation in this way, “You cannot walk down the 
street on this island without counting every house and knowing two or three people on 
the street that have cancer, or have had cancer, or have died from cancer.”269  
J. HISTORICAL TRAUMA: FEAR AND DISTRUST 
Fear and distrust of government officials and their actions represent significant 
challenges in the response to varied emergent events, including the lack of confidence in 
government agencies to assist minority populations in disasters.270 Communicating and 
coordinating messaging with the public during emergencies can be difficult. Public health 
events, such as unfamiliar, unidentified, or intentionally released agents pose even greater 
communication challenges for health practitioners and their partners.271  
Historical experience and evidence support that these threats have a “powerful 
potential to generate fear, cause negative behavioral responses such as social stigma, and 
undermine confidence in social institutions.”272 These veracities impede efforts to 
manage an emergency, such as a bio-terrorism incident or emerging health threat 
partnered with varied socioeconomic barriers, such as language, culture, and the realities 
of historical trauma.273 
According to a study sponsored and funded by the CDC between 2002–2006, 
results supported that the populations across the United States question the “capacity and 
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readiness of local, state, and federal governments to handle terrorist disasters” and the 
results were reflective of past survey and qualitative research findings.274 The study also 
validated published findings that suggest that “distrust of the government” is more 
prevalent among minority communities who fear unequal treatment in a disaster.275 
Furthermore, results were reflective of another study conducted showing that honesty in a 
government response to an emergency incident is essential to establishing and nurturing 
trust within and across U.S. communities and populations.276 
Research supports that emerging health threats produce strong emotional 
reactions, such as anxiety, shock, hostility, fear, and distrust.277 Historical trauma—and 
the fear and distrust associated with it—present significant barriers that impede response 
to emerging health threats. Research supports the need of emergency planners and 
responders to re-examine their plans, protocols, and procedures closely, and take 
appropriate actions to ensure policies and planning elements take language and cultural 
barriers, as well as historical trauma, into account. The results of these actions will help 
protect varied populations and save more lives in communities impacted by emergencies 
across the country. Some recommendations for bridging these gaps are provided in the 
final chapter of this thesis.  
Thus far, certain socioeconomic barriers—and associated challenges, such as fear 
and distrust—have been discussed in this thesis. The following chapter, the 
SARS/Canada Case Study, examines how isolation and quarantine and emergency risk 
communication practices were initiated and managed during the 2003 SARS outbreak 
event in Canada. This chapter analyzes responses and approaches taken by Canadian 
healthcare workers and their partners to mitigate the additional spread of the disease 
across their communities. The research gathered in the following chapter is intended to 
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assist health and healthcare practitioners in the United States if a similar disease—with 
similar or more severe impacts—were to impact the homeland. 
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V. SARS AND CANADA CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the Canadian public health practitioner’s 
SARS isolation and quarantine practices with respect to socioeconomic factors, and 
consider applying their most relevant lessons learned in the United States to assist both 
public health and healthcare practitioners in their approach to future public health 
emergencies and threats. It examines experiences associated with the SARS event to 
“highlight the broad legal and policy challenges in preparing for an outbreak of infectious 
disease or similar public health emergency.”278 The Canadian public health workforce 
dealt with varied, historic, socioeconomic barriers (language, culture, and historical 
trauma), yet statistics and data supports their quarantining protocols were successful and 
the perceptions of those segregated that they did not feel wrongfully imprisoned.279 
The chapter is based on an analysis of the “history of quarantine and isolation, 
relevant U.S. laws, and the roles of various governmental bodies in infectious disease 
control.”280 It also outlines lessons learned from Canada, which was impacted by the 
SARS outbreak along with China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam.281 The 
research supports three key categories that public health officials and other policy and 
decision makers need to consider when considering improvements to public health 
quarantine dynamics within the homeland. They include (1) legal and public health 
systems (which could include the interaction and disentangling of the legal system and 
the public health system, (2) public health and healthcare infrastructure (such as 
determining the roles and responsibilities of the public health and healthcare workforce 
and the ethical dynamics involved, and (3) law enforcement and ancillary services (such 
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as looking at re-aligning policing activities to meet the needs of the health emergency, 
which could include the delivery of food and medicine to those quarantined, homebound 
populations). These broad lessons learned provide the foundation for alternatives in 
planning and preparing the United States for a serious outbreak of an infectious, disease, 
such as SARS or a similar public health emergency.282 Research supports that the U.S. 
public health and hospital workforce could learn from and improve their planning and 
response tactics based on Canada’s approach in working with the SARS outbreak from 
2002–2003.  
Containment of a deadly disease, such as SARS, is imperative, as the impact not 
only affects the general population but front-line healthcare providers who through 
exposure during caring for others end up being intensive care patients themselves.283 
This chapter provides strategies to implement changes in policies and governance to help 
protect both the general and healthcare workforce populations in the United States.  
B. BACKGROUND 
1. What is SARS? 
SARS is a highly pathogenic form of pneumonia that originated in the Guangdong 
Province of China in 2002.284 In early 2003, the infectious disease was discovered in 
many countries and was being passed person to person via carriers traveling on 
international flights.285 
Medical science supports that the main symptoms of SARS include “a high fever 
(over 38 degrees Celsius) and respiratory problems, including dry cough, shortness of 
breath or breathing difficulties.”286 Furthermore, the disease is spread through tiny 
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droplets released into the air, as well as through “contact with contaminated surfaces.”287 
The SARS event impacted populations across the globe. Almost 8,100 people became ill 
from the disease between November 2002 and July 2003, and included either 
“pneumonia or respiratory distress syndrome.”288 Of the nearly 8,100 cases, 774 people 
died and by July 2003, no new cases of SARS were reported and the WHO declared the 
worldwide outbreak to be over.289 Only eight persons in the United States were 
“laboratory-confirmed” as having SARS with the United States reporting zero “SARS-
related deaths” and all eight of the individuals who tested positive had traveled to 
countries where the SARS virus was prevalent.290  
2. Isolation and Quarantine 
This chapter mentions both isolation and quarantine that according to CDC, “help 
protect the public by preventing exposure to people who have or may have a contagious 
disease.”291 It is important for health responders and their partners to understand the 
definitions of the two potentially life-saving activities, isolation and quarantine. 
According to CDC, isolation “separates sick people with a contagious disease from 
people who are not sick” while quarantine “separates and restricts the movement of 
people who were exposed to a contagious disease to see if they become sick.”292 
In Toronto, many people representing many disciplines were faced with very 
difficult decisions as a result of the SARS cases impacting their populations. These 
disciplines included practitioners of the health and medical fields, local, provincial, and 
federal government organizations and the general public.293 During the SARS outbreak, 
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some Canadians were forced to assess difficult situations and make difficult decisions 
with very limited information and with very little time to do so. Research states that the 
most affected group during the SARS outbreak—the same people on the firing line—
were the workers in the health care community.294  
Outbreaks have happened throughout history. History states that in the Middle 
Ages—when the plague was spread between Asia and Western Europe—it took over 
three years to travel from one area to the other. During the SARS event, the disease 
spread from Hong Kong to Toronto in less than 15 hours.295 Many health professionals 
consider SARS as the most widely and quickly spreading infectious disease via travel of 
infected humans in recent history.296 Thus, many may ask who then is responsible for the 
spread of disease within and outside of borders? Although local, state, and federal health 
agencies are ultimately accountable for maintaining public health and health safety 
matters, both isolation and quarantine remain a politically polarized topic impacting 
states’ willingness to address the issue as it could be very unpopular with the voting 
public.297 For instance, under Section 361 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S. 
Code § 264), the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services is authorized to take 
appropriate measures to prevent the “entry and spread of communicable diseases from 
foreign countries into the United States and between states.”298 Although infrequently 
enacted, these control measures can and have included isolation and quarantine.299  
Over time, the United States has become less restrictive when it comes to 
isolation or quarantine issues, and due to this stance, the United States could have a 
problem.300 The inconsistency of quarantining amongst states, paired with the varied or 
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non-existent implementation strategies and practices for those states looking to strengthen 
said practices, leads to a lack of “buy-in” and a lack of trust from those quarantined, 
particularly those from minority populations. The researcher contends if upmost respect 
is extended and conditions are made a priority for the care of those quarantined (and their 
families); the United States would have a better chance to implement and enforce 
quarantine guidelines. The researcher’s belief is supported by the examples provided in 
the SARS outbreak in Canada. 
During the 2002–2003 SARS outbreak, the Canadian government issued 
mandatory quarantining.301 It is important to note, however, that before relying on any 
health agencies legal power to do so, practitioners must recognize the importance of the 
public’s “will” to fight an infectious disease scenario impacting their populations. 
Without the public’s cooperation, laws that sit “on the books” are all but useless.302 The 
United States can learn from and apply lessons learned during the SARS outbreak in 
Canada. These lessons learned, if implemented and evaluated for effectiveness and 
efficiency, could support a revised approach to quarantining practices in the homeland. 
The next section details key practices and lessons learned during the SARS outbreak (and 
analyzes the effectiveness of those healthcare practices) during a severe, deadly outbreak 
impacting Canadian (and potentially American) populations.  
C. THE CASE STUDY 
A major U.S. study was conducted following the SARS quarantine in Toronto. 
Various means of data collection were used, such as “interviews, telephone polls and 
focus groups.”303 The results of the study concluded that “civic duty, not fear of legal 
consequences” served as the primary motivator for individuals quarantined as a result of 
the event.304  
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Furthermore, overall, evidence supports that fear of “running afoul of the law” 
had little to do with quarantine compliance.305 Of the 68 “General Population Survey” 
participants issued quarantine orders, no one responded that their primary motivation for 
complying was to avoid “enforcement measures” and penalties.306 Thus, what generated 
this remarkably high percentage of those naming “civic duty” as their primary reason for 
accepting quarantining orders? Although SARS cases occurred outside of the healthcare 
provider arena, three primary reasons could explain why these responses were so high in 
Canada.  
First, Canada has a publicly-funded healthcare system, unlike the United States, 
which likely helped promote quarantine compliance in response to the SARS’ outbreak. 
Secondly, the public overwhelmingly cooperated during the event, which was hailed by 
professionals at the CDC. An expert from the CDC in an interview with the Canadian 
Health Commission added, “We are all forever grateful for that fact that when you did 
this, you treated your Canadian citizens with dignity and respect and a lot of people are 
starting to write on this in academia . . . The way you preceded appeared to be 
transparent. It appeared to be open and I think it worked. The data is stunning.”307 
Lastly, the Canadian government has established a public relationship built on 
trust. As referenced earlier, practitioners must respect and work to engage with the public 
to ensure the healthiest outcomes from outbreaks, such as SARS.308 The public’s 
cooperation is reliant on the general understanding of what is required of them related to 
disease control and prevention measures through voluntary quarantine. Public messaging 
is essential and can only be accomplished when populations are constantly kept informed 
by health information officers. Ensuring timely messages are delivered to entire 
populations helps establish and grow trust of government health practitioners responding 
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to varied outbreaks impacting communities.309 These key practices—supporting an 
overall positive response by the health community in treatment of healthcare workers—
highlight the essential poignant improvement goals for healthcare workers in the United 
States caring for their peer healthcare workers in response to emerging public health 
threats.  
In addition to responses citing quarantine as their civic duty; many shared their 
trust in the Canadian healthcare workforce. As is known, fear and distrust of public health 
and emergency response officials in disasters can and have had dire consequences, such 
as those documented experiences stemming from Hurricane Katrina.310 Evidence 
supports that during the SARS outbreak, populations across Toronto, generally, trusted 
the “judgment and expertise” of the Canadian Chief Medical Officer of Health.311 It is 
important to note that the public will not follow any “expert” regardless of the power they 
may have unless trust is established and the communities trust their motives, as well as 
their knowledge and skillsets.312 
Complementing the survey conducted in Toronto, the U.S. based group, Trust for 
America’s Health, distributed a survey in 2007 to evaluate isolation and quarantine 
practices in the United States as a result of the SARS event.313 Survey results reflected 
that nearly 9 out of 10 Americans would agree to a “voluntary quarantine” order and 
much like the Canadians surveyed, considered quarantining practices as their “civic duty” 
to help control the spread of infectious disease across U.S. communities.314 Interestingly, 
of the 10 percent who responded that they would not obey a government issued voluntary 
quarantine, 64 percent shared their reason was due to fear of losing needed income with 
missing work while 39 percent responded their reason for non-compliance was fear of 
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losing their jobs altogether.315 This type of support was provided for in Canada, where 
Toronto Mayor Lastman assisted Canadian businesses and their public as a result of the 
outbreak, and may be one of the contributing factors to their success.316  
D. FEAR AND OTHER IMPACTS EXPERIENCED DURING SARS  
Effective response examples have been presented in this policy memo and 
although quarantine efforts were deemed a success and were on the broad scale effective 
in addressing the possibly of wider spread of the disease, public panic, distrust or 
reluctance among cultures can exist, which was, in part, a reality during SARS with fear, 
stigmatization, and even discrimination taking place during the outbreak.317  
In American cities, fear seemed to spread quicker than SARS itself, and for Asian 
Americans, the outbreak was particularly difficult for reasons other than direct exposure, 
as rumors were “frantic and virtually impossible to contain.”318 In New York’s Sunset 
District, some locals gossiped that the owner of a thriving dim sum restaurant in their city 
was suffering from SARS. In Seattle, rumors were floating around that two employees at 
a neighborhood grocery store had come down with the disease. Meanwhile, in Honolulu, 
residents gossiped that a worker at a popular “roasted-meats” shop in Chinatown was sick 
from SARS. In reality, none of the reports were true but that did not seem to matter. Their 
businesses were crippled as harshly as “if there were a boycott.”319 The same situations 
occurred in San Francisco, as shops and restaurants felt shunned by their customers until 
a “top county health official” appeared downtown one day and reassured them they were 
safe.320 After the event, many shop and restaurant owners declared “ethnic stereotyping” 
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had occurred and attributed their losses to irrational and scared tourists who simply 
stayed away from Asian-American businesses in the city.321  
In contrast, during SARS, the Canadian workforce focused on clear, timely 
information, which assisted in the response to the outbreak and the public’s reactions to 
the event, but even Canada had its fair share of fear resulting in negative economic 
impacts. The then Toronto Mayor Lastman stated, “The businesses are hurting, they’re 
hurting bad.”322 “People’s lives are being adversely affected by both the disease and 
public perception of the crisis.”323 To lessen the impact, Canada earmarked funds to 
assist impacted businesses. Toronto joined Ontario in securing $10 million dollars for a 
promotion campaign intended to gain the public’s trust that Toronto was a safe place to 
visit. These cities partnered with the Canadian federal government to accomplish varied 
promotion efforts, all of which were deemed successful. The United States did not take 
any of these measures.324  
Addressing fear and discrimination toward individuals infected or impacted by 
infectious disease serves as one the primary ways to control further transmission.325 
Research states that individuals who are “feared and stigmatized” may not seek needed 
care to remain anonymous in their community. Although it is safe to say that these 
impacts and emotions did not impact entire populations, Asian-American communities 
were particularly affected during the SARS outbreak that impacted countries across the 
globe.326 During this outbreak, Asian populations were discriminated against, as some 
people were “fearful or suspicious” of them being a carrier of the virus and expected 
them to be removed and quarantined.327 Based on the lessons learned from the event, the 
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following section outlines policy recommendations deemed a priority for the Canadian 
public health workforce and provide policy foundations to address future emerging public 
health threats in the United States.  
E. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES (BASED 
ON THE SARS OUTBREAK IN CANADA) 
As expressed throughout this chapter; establishing and maintaining trust is 
paramount, as is community outreach and engagement. Ensuring that both response plans 
and response actions maintain community trust and community outreach will promote 
effective and efficient response to public health emergencies, such as those realized 
during the SARS outbreak. Five major recommendations were derived from the 
facilitated group discussions with key informants following the event, and although 
specific to the SARS outbreak, they can be modified slightly to address future 
communicable disease scenarios for the United States, which include but are not limited 
to this highly-contagious respiratory illness.328 The five recommendations are as follows:  
• Develop simple, tailored SARS prevention messages  
• Develop SARS information materials in various Asian languages 
• Disseminate SARS information through multiple and culturally 
appropriate channels, including (but not limited to) community visits, 
town hall meetings, and health education and communication channels to 
complement mass media messages 
• Establish partnerships with local Asian-American community-based 
organizations to educate the public  
• Ensure that the CDC would continue to provide leadership and 
coordination in preventing and controlling SARS.329 
Additionally, three key practices need to be strengthened by the United States 
based on lessons learned and key practices associated with the Canada SARS event.  
                                                 




1. Legal and Public Health Systems—Quarantine and Isolation 
To respond promptly and effectively to SARS, affected countries, such as the 
United States, will need “public health laws that establish a mechanism for regulating 
travel into and out of the affected areas.”330 These measures include “case surveillance, 
reporting and analysis,” as well as a consistent and germane plan for quarantine and 
isolation practices.331 Furthermore, the United States needs the political will to enforce 
these measures and additional studies are needed to determine if incentives or penalties 
are effective in promoting compliance with quarantine.332 
U.S. laws have to account for flexibility to allow for the incident appropriate 
responses to new and emerging public health threats.333 In addition, U.S. public health 
officials need receive training and a base understanding of the “statutory and regulatory 
procedures for invoking authority for quarantine and isolation” activities, and when 
necessary, the triggers necessary to enact such measures when necessary.334 Health 
officials need to account for ethical and civil liberty concerns with regards to initiating 
quarantining protocols.335 Evidence supports that although quarantining can be very 
effective, practitioners need to consider all factors carefully and be prepared to defend 
their decision to enforce quarantine orders once they are initiated in their jurisdictions.336 
2. Public Health and Health Care Infrastructure—Stockpiling of 
Medications, Supplies, and Equipment  
Quarantine and isolation is challenging for any jurisdiction to implement. Canada 
relied on its public health infrastructure to “coordinate the public health response among 
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all levels of government domestically and internationally.”337 Public health practitioners 
also coordinated their efforts with their partner healthcare providers to ensure sufficient 
staffing levels and adequate “facilities, equipment, and medications” were available to 
minimize the toll from the SARS outbreak.338 Following the event, the CDC’s strategic 
national stockpile (SNS) expanded its inventory of ventilators and other essential supplies 
and equipment, but improved logistics planning remains a gap. Besides the stockpiled 
products available through public health and at healthcare facilities, Canada distributed a 
vast amount of critical medical supplies straight to the impacted populations. The benefits 
from this direct community-based outreach are clearly connected and are supported 
through feedback from those impacted and grew an already established, strong element of 
trust between government-based response entities and the Canadian public.339 
Admittedly, the United States does not have Canada’s national healthcare system but 
strategically reaching back into its private medical systems to improve outreach efforts 
remains an important but under-explored option. Supporting this effort would mean that 
the DHHS or the CDC would work in partnership, via the establishment of memoranda of 
understanding (MOUs) that would be enacted in times of health emergencies allowing 
them to do whatever is deemed appropriate to assisting in the response activities to 
outbreaks, such as SARS. 
3. Law Enforcement and Ancillary Services—Isolation and Quarantine 
Enforcement Considerations 
Successful initiation of quarantine and isolation practices among impacted 
countries required both ancillary and logistical support.340 This support included 
partnership with law enforcement to help “ensure compliance, wage replacement 
systems, delivery systems for food and medical supplies.”341 Law enforcement officials 
                                                 






also assisted with public instruction and communication activities not only to provide 
education but gain the support and trust of the public.342  
Although shifting from their primary roles, law enforcement served as a critical 
partner to health and healthcare practitioners during the SARS event.343 The lesson 
learned from Canada was that traditional law enforcement activities were altered. A 
different kind of police presence, such as distributing food and conducting health and 
wellness checks, took place providing positive impacts during and after the event. As 
referenced earlier, Canada experienced a high amount of “voluntary compliance” 
pertaining to quarantining efforts but it remains unclear if that would be replicated in the 
United States given its “cultural notions of individuality, due process, and skepticism of 
government.”344 Moving forward, populations consisting of varied “racial, ethnic, 
religious, linguistic and cultural groups” should be included in the quarantine planning 
process to ensure specific needs of each group are established in advance of an infectious 
disease incident, such as SARS. Policies stemming from the Canadian health workforce 
could assist the United State in addressing the need to ensure what is feasible and 
infeasible based on individual or family conditions and ensuring that law enforcement is 
trained and aware of these policies and practices to assist in overcoming skepticism.345 
These recommendations implemented in part or whole will assist in the planning and 
response activities associated with addressing emerging public health threats impacting 
the homeland. 
The next and final chapter of this thesis offers a way forward. The 
“Recommendations and Conclusion” chapter provides practitioners guidance to assist 
them in their efforts to “bridge the gap” that exists in communities to help ensure that 
entire populations have the best chance to survive bioterrorism incidents or widespread 
infectious disease outbreaks.  
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
The first step toward change is awareness. The second step is 
acceptance.346 
 
A. RESULTS  
The basis for this research topic stems from certain local and state PHEP grant 
activities—managed by the CDC—focused on jurisdictions’ ability to dispense life-
saving medications and medical supplies to 100 percent of an impacted population within 
48 hours of a bioterrorism incident.347 Managing the state medical countermeasure 
program for many years, the researcher felt it was important to examine barriers that local 
and state public health practitioners face in their missions to provide emergency 
medications, healthcare, or other services as a result of widespread infectious disease 
outbreaks and bioterrorism incidents. 
He questioned how it would be possible for health practitioners to reach entire 
impacted populations within 48 hours when socioeconomic barriers, fear, and distrust of 
government exist in communities. The purpose of the research was to understand better 
the extent of these barriers—the significance and relevancy of the barriers—and how they 
impede response to emerging health threats. Many socioeconomic barriers and affiliated 
challenges need to be considered but his research was based on three primary “pillars” 
associated to the SDOH, which are (1) language, (2) culture, and (3) historical trauma.348 
His findings centered around the barriers—along with contributing factors, such as fear 
and distrust of government—to understand their connection or disconnection to health 
emergencies better. The results gathered, and the data, analyzed, presented a much larger 
problem space than anticipated.  
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Before researching this topic, when considering the CDC’s model of providing 
medications and healthcare to 100 percent of a population within 48 hours of a dire health 
emergency, the researcher predicted a more realistic percentage would be the ability to 
reach 80–90 percent of a population in that timeframe. After researching barriers across 
the United States that language, culture and historical trauma present—along with fear 
and distrust of government—the percentage significantly dropped. It became more 
realistic that reaching 60 percent of community populations within the critical time period 
for emergency antibiotics to be effective is more accurately the baseline from which 
public health and healthcare practitioners should work. It became more and more 
apparent as he researched this subject matter that both the gaps—and the impacts that 
stem from these gaps—have been vastly underestimated in this nation’s current 
operational and strategic planning and response practices.  
During this research project, the researcher expanded upon the CDC-managed 
CRI program, which focuses on bioterrorism incidents; specifically, response capabilities 
by public health and their partners in the event of a weaponized, aerosolized anthrax 
event. He quickly realized the importance of applicability to other emerging health 
emergencies, as well as the risks and impacts stemming from a bioterrorism attack. 
Researching and analyzing the dynamics involved using a “60/40” lens provided a better 
understanding as to the root causes of certain behaviors, or a lack of behaviors, by some 
populations when faced with health emergencies. Although public health emergency 
practitioners may assume or predict that their plans will reach 100 percent of a 
population, the findings of this research supports that a more realistic starting point is 
practitioners will only reach 60 percent of a population and 40 percent will not receive 
the care needed to survive certain health emergencies or natural disasters based, in part, 
by the factors presented in this thesis.  
In short, before researching these barriers—and their associations to health 
emergencies—the researcher never would have guessed the gap or problem space was 
this severe and this project found evidence of these gaps in all regions across the United 
States. Although “bridging the gap” may seem impossible for health professionals and 
their partners, failure to address these interwoven barriers will have both short- and long-
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term negative consequences. Besides the increased morbidity and mortality rates (health 
impacts) across populations, the failure to understand and address barriers more directly 
will further widen the gap that currently exists between U.S. populations. Violence can 
certainly be expected as a result of thoughts of preferential treatment resulting in longer-
term community and governmental dividedness across the homeland. He deemed it 
critically important to analyze the gap, the problem space, and help ensure public health 
emergency planning and response policies and protocols accurately account for these 
gaps to minimize morbidity and mortality rates across sub-populations as a result of a 
widespread health emergency or bioterrorism attack.  
The researcher’s first socioeconomic barrier examined how language challenges 
impede a response to emerging health threats and the realities that LEP presents to health 
professionals and their partners. For example, the highly ethnically diverse City of Los 
Angeles has approximately 224 languages spoken and less than 50 percent of the 
population lists English as their first language.349 Have planners accounted for translation 
services for even a fraction of these languages? He also found that DHH populations 
provide unique challenges to health practitioners; and few PHEP planning documents 
reference outreach and communication strategies for DHH persons in their communities. 
Language, alone, begins the gap-widening process, but as referenced throughout this 
thesis, many barriers are interwoven not separate entities from one another. He found that 
a significant percentage of this nation’s “whole community” populations have a blend of 
varied socioeconomic barriers that has and certainly can continue to impede U.S. 
response efforts to varied health emergencies.  
Chapter III explored cultural barriers and their relevance to emerging health 
threats. The researcher learned that populations react, respond, and recover based on their 
individual and group experiences associated with their culture.350 Furthermore, he 
discovered that some cultures deem government assistance as “charity” and may view 
government aid as dishonorable.351 Many populations feel they need to take care of 
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themselves and their families, in any situation, without the government stepping in to 
provide help.352 He also learned that cultural barriers can be addressed through increased 
community outreach to establish and maintain trust with varied, diverse populations. It is 
this critically important outreach prior to incidents that provide the best chance for more 
of this nation’s populations to survive bioterrorism or other health emergencies occurring 
in U.S. culturally diverse communities.  
Chapter IV explored many aspects of historical trauma. This topic, by far, was the 
most “eye-opening” chapter in this thesis and provided insight relative to certain, 
substantial, past and recent government-managed incidents impacting the psycho-social 
aspects of certain populations. Research revealed the connection between historical 
trauma and the fear and distrust that exists between sub-populations and local, state, and 
federal governmental workforce. The researcher found that this distrust exists for several 
reasons, and how specific governmental impacts and actions against certain populations 
have increased the gap that needs bridged to respond effectively to health emergencies in 
the United States. One of the populations discussed in the chapter was that of Native 
American communities and some of the trauma they have experienced at the hands of the 
government throughout their history. For example, a 1974 study concluded that as many 
as 42 percent of all Native American women of childbearing age had, in 1972, been 
medically sterilized without their consent by government healthcare staff working 
through the BIA.353  
The researcher found that historical trauma is multi-generational and the 
governmental actions of the past have and continue to contribute to the fear and distrust 
of agencies. This fear and distrust have and continues to result in negative consequences, 
such as higher morbidity and mortality rates (as seen during Hurricane Katrina), as well 
as civil unrest and community divisiveness.354 Socioeconomic barriers, such as language, 
culture, and historical trauma are significant. He learned that the fear and distrust of 
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government stem from these and varied but commonly combined barriers. It is imperative 
that practitioners understand the significance and magnitude that socioeconomic barriers 
and fear and distrust present to address and work to bridge the gaps that exist in their 
communities. Doing so may, someday, help in the repair of the psychological damage 
and impacts that stem from government-based traumatic events upon sub-populations. 
Furthermore, he learned that dedicating efforts to do so will increase the probability that 
more of this country’s populations will survive bioterrorism attacks or other emerging 
health threats impacting U.S. communities in the homeland. 
The SARS and Canada case study discussed in Chapter V looked at ways public 
health and healthcare practitioners could effectively and efficiently protect U.S. 
populations in an outbreak particularly when isolation and quarantining measures are 
necessary. The researcher learned that the Canadian healthcare workforce (and their 
government agencies in general) has been able to establish a stronger bond and sense of 
trust with their sub-populations, evidenced during the SARS outbreak in 2003. Asian 
Canadians willingly submitted to isolation and quarantining recommendations initiated 
by Canadian health workers in an effort to contain the spread of the highly infectious 
disease impacting their communities. The recommendations contained in Chapter V 
provided a path—a model—from which the U.S. public health and healthcare workforce 
should use to help ensure “voluntary compliance” of isolation and quarantine practices to 
help thwart the greater impacts as a result of a highly-pathogenic infectious disease 
scenario.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS  
This thesis has outlined various socioeconomic barriers that will impede a 
response to bioterrorism and emerging health threats. The researcher has made the 
argument that socioeconomic barriers will have a significant impact in an event requiring 
emergency medication dispensing to 100 percent of a population in 48 hours. Before 
researching the event, he had no idea that the gap to be bridged would be so expansive 
and far-reaching. As mentioned earlier in this thesis, no changes will happen overnight, 
but with dedicated policy and strategy level efforts—what seem like daunting, impossible 
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tasks—can be achieved and the socioeconomic gap can be bridged. The following 
recommendations aim to assist practitioners with these efforts. 
1. Community Outreach 
To help mitigate against differential rates of morbidity and mortality in future 
health emergencies, it is critical that the entire U.S. public, including specific subgroups, 
have access to credible, accessible, and meaningful information that enables them to 
make appropriate use of potentially lifesaving emergency MCMs.355 Although local 
public health agencies are well-positioned to understand the populations they serve, more 
deliberate approaches and emphasis must be placed to develop or strengthen relationships 
with faith-based leaders and other trusted intermediaries to reach specific communities, 
and to elicit greater understanding as to the health knowledge needs of diverse constituent 
groups.356 Furthermore, local, state, and federal health practitioners need to establish or 
strengthen ties with national non-governmental organizations that represent the health 
interests of minority populations. These community-based relationships are beneficial 
and could lead to partners serving as conduits for targeted health messages that 
government agencies may need to disseminate if bioterrorism incidents or other emerging 
health threats were to occur.357 
2. Building Trust through Community Resilience  
Building community resilience to disasters is essential and is commonly described 
as “the ability to mitigate and rebound quickly.”358 Community resilience has become 
more popular among public health emergency preparedness practitioners and is now a 
“central focus and a required activity for all public health departments.”359 Viewing 
preparedness through a community resilience lens provides a foundation to work from for 
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improving community engagement and outreach efforts that will strengthen community 
relationships and improve both communication strategies and trust with entire 
populations across the homeland.360 
The newly-developed CDC PHEP guidance incorporates the perspective that 
when disasters occur, social, cultural, and historical context of preexisting health 
disparities and socioeconomic barriers must be factored into response, as well as in some 
populations, the underlying realities of the mistrust of government.361  
3. Using Appropriate “Whole Community” Risk Communications to 
Bridge the Gap  
Effective risk communications serve as the basis emergency response missions to 
varied health emergencies.362 The researcher has learned that emergency messaging 
needs to be developed in a “culturally appropriate manner” to ensure “whole community” 
populations adhere to emergency messaging and safety recommendations put forth by 
health and healthcare practitioners as a result of an emerging health threat.363 
Leveraging a “whole community” approach to risk communications is beneficial 
and should be considered an essential approach to improve existing plans and procedures 
aimed at communication to entire populations as a result of a bioterrorism incident or 
other emergent health threat impacting communities. Whole community refers to a 
population’s collective understanding of their specific vulnerabilities and needs in their 
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community.364 A whole community approach to emergencies decides the most 
appropriate methods to “organize and strengthen their assets, capacities, and interests.”365 
Public health and healthcare practitioners must evaluate methods of “risk 
communication” and integrate those methods into the “whole community” approach.366 
Taking this approach to emergency preparedness goals will strengthen partnerships, 
promote trust, and build relationships with varied community groups.367  
Establishing relationships with “grassroots stakeholders” are critical when 
strengthening and improving emergency outreach efforts to compromised populations in 
communities.368 This approach will assist public health practitioners and their partners to 
“establish ongoing communication channels that ensure the continuous flow of 
information” to whole community populations.369 A primary benefit to incorporating this 
approach is that the time saved to distribute emergency messages throughout 
communities. Furthermore, practitioners should ensure that health literacy levels have 
been accounted for as part of their grassroots efforts, which will help ensure protection 
and care of all community populations is provided in emergencies.370  
Establishing a stronger, more-effective risk communication system across the 
“whole community” will help connect people to the locations and medical services they 
need as a result of a bioterrorism or other emerging health threat impacting populations in 
the homeland.371 
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C. “BRIDGING THE GAP”—FUTURE RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES  
While this thesis and research focus has centered on certain socioeconomic 
barriers and challenges, additional research, exploration, and analyses to build upon these 
findings will continue efforts to bridge the gaps that exist between populations. As 
discussed throughout this thesis, these dedicated and purposeful efforts by practitioners 
across the homeland security enterprise (HSE) will help protect more lives in times of 
health or health-related emergencies. Although the researcher has addressed some of the 
socioeconomic barriers that exist to impede response to bioterrorism or emerging health 
threats, he has certainly not addressed all of them. It would behoove the HSE to further 
investigate and predict impacts and variables associated to other aspects of the SDOH, 
SES or fear management. These barriers and challenges are critically important, too, as 
they relate to response missions. The three particular areas provide opportunities for 
future research by homeland security or health practitioners. Each is described with 
emphasis placed on their relevance to the response aspects required in health 
emergencies.  
1. Socioeconomic Status  
SES serves as a predictor of outcomes following natural disasters or health 
emergencies. A study was conducted following Hurricane Hugo (a storm impacting 
South Carolina in 1989 that claimed the lives of 22 people and triggered evacuations of 
more than 250,000.)372 This study was aimed at response problems and challenges 
stemming from the event.  
Evidence supports that the majority of those impacted by the event had special 
needs stemming from “extreme poverty, high illiteracy rates, physical isolation in rural 
communities, fear and distrust of government officials” including the overall lack of 
information after the storm.373 The investigation found that very little outreach was done, 
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pre-storm, with populations impacted from poor areas and emergency programs were 
“not reaching these people.”374  
Additional SES (and the correlation between and consequences following health 
emergences) should be researched to identify and implement additional strategies and 
policies to bridge the socioeconomic gap that continues to widen across this nation’s 
populations. 
2. Social Determinants of Health  
Although referenced in this thesis, the connections between SDoH and health 
emergencies need to be further researched to assist in efforts to bridge the gaps that 
impede response to emerging public health threats.  
SDoH can best be described as the “causes behind the causes.”375 SDoH are the 
“upstream social and economic factors that largely but insidiously dictate the health—
and disease—of individuals and populations.”376 SDoH takes into account the living 
conditions and environmental specifics in people’s lives that relate to health outcomes 
including the consequences that can be anticipated in disasters and health emergencies.377 
SDoH includes access to schools, transportation, safe housing, and access to healthcare 
and freedom from discrimination.378 According to the CDC, integrating SDoH into 
response missions will not only “improve individual and population health but also 
advance health equity.”379 Early on, health equity was one of the barriers or “pillars” the 
researcher was investigating to perhaps include in this thesis. The project, however, 
became too large to expand on and incorporate into this thesis. That said, he would 
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recommend future researchers consider this SDoH component and its association and 
impact in health emergencies across varied populations. 
3. Fear Management 
Throughout this thesis, evidence was provided that associate fear and distrust of 
government as both relevant and significant barriers impeding response to emergent 
public health events. Managing fear is critical in helping to ensure entire populations 
receive the emergency medical prophylaxis, sheltering, or other care needed as a result of 
a bioterrorism incident or emerging health threat. Additional research associated and 
dedicated to fear and distrust and emerging health threats would also assist in bridging 
the socioeconomic barriers and bioterrorism or other health threat. 
Health practitioners are tasked with being stewards of fear management. While 
public health traditionally focuses on population level health, individual fears and 
questions are most important to those directly impacted by an incident. Such concerns 
must be acknowledged with empathy to foster trust among affected individuals, assure 
them that their health and safety is a priority, and encourage compliance with official 
guidance.380 Empathizing with minority and other marginalized groups inherently 
involves understanding historical conflicts (discussed earlier in this thesis) between these 
groups and the public health and healthcare community. It is essential that health 
professionals are able to recognize public anxiety around the possibility of human 
experimentation and address concerns about clinical trials and epidemiological studies in 
the context of historical incidents.381 Fear stemming from the Tuskegee Experiment has 
impacted more recent public health emergencies, such as H1N1, as distrust and fear carry 
forward and the actions as government officials should be considered to have multi-
generational consequences. Among poor, African American subpopulations in Los 
Angeles County, CA, for example, long-standing distrust in the U.S. government 
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stemming from the Tuskegee Experiment led local faith-based leaders to urge their 
congregants not to accept the H1N1 vaccine, local disc jockeys from stations with 
predominantly African American audiences to advise their listeners not to be vaccinated, 
and community members to forward chain emails and like Facebook posts with anti-
vaccination messages.382 Subsequently, vaccination rates for African Americans in Los 
Angeles County were lower than rates for all other racial and ethnic groups in that area.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Although the researchers trust the information provided in this thesis will have an 
immediate influence and impact—and he can guarantee it will in Wisconsin—he hopes it 
will spark additional research thesis projects associated with language, culture, historical 
trauma and other socioeconomic barriers and situations that exist across communities. As 
evidenced, it can be assumed these barriers will significantly impede response efforts to 
emergency MCM events. Thus, practitioners need to take deliberate actions to “bridge the 
gap” in their jurisdictions.  
Furthering this work is important to respond better and assist entire populations 
impacted by future bioterrorism or emerging public health threats. Efforts and emphasis 
placed on activities to “bridge the gap” will further reduce fear, distrust, and 
misperceptions of preferential treatment among populations. As a result, lower mobility 
and morality rates could be expected and the risk of rioting, civil unrest and community 
divisiveness lessened across the homeland.  
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